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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
IN THE FRC: 
THE CASE OF HAINAN ISLAND 
This thesis examines the dynamic process of regional 
development in Hainan island between 1980 and 1990. During these 
ten years, Hainan island experienced very significant changes 
both in its administrative and economic organizations. The first 
goal of this study is to review and get a better understanding of 
this gradual and simultaneous transformation -·of Hainan island 
into China's newest province and largest SEZ. Since Hainan 
development strategy took shape and was applied within the PRC, a 
unitary state, it also al lows us to study the evolution of such 
strategy in the context of a centralized government system. Thus, • 
the ~econd goal of this exploration is an attempt to evaluate the 
degree of influence the central (Beijing), provincial CGuangdong) 
and regional/local (Hainan) authorities had on the evolution of 
the region's development strategy. This al lows us to discuss the 
fluctuation between regional autonomy and central control. The 
study revealed that Hainan's administrative changes have unified 
and centralized the management of the region, thus consolidating 
the power of the provincial authorities and . apparently enhancing 
its degree of autonomy. Bu~, as this research suggests, while the 
establishment of Hainan province was initially presented as a 
measure to further speed up the region's development, it 
ultimately allowed the Central authorities to strengthen their 
control over the region. Thereby seriously hindering the 
effectiveness the selected strategy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee 
of the People's Republic of China has implemented a series of 
administrative and economic reforms which have completely 
transformed its development strategy. The Maoist model of self-
sufficient and even development has been rejected and replaced by 
the Open-Door policy and the acceptance of uneven 
development. 1 By recognizing the importance of regional 
comparative advantages, the Chinese government progressively 
stimulated the growth of regional development strategy. In this 
respect, the creation of four Special Economic Zones rep~esent 
China's most dramatic and best documented experiments in regional 
development. 2 But as these planned, specialized and 
comprehensive regional development projects were carried out, 
less articulated regional development strategy were appearing in 
other parts of China. In early 1980, the Southern island of 
Hainan became the seat of such development. This dynamic process 
of regional development in Hainan island between 1980 and 1990 is 
the subject of this thesis. 
1. For an interesting discussion of the rise and implication of uneven development, see for example: 
WRegional economic development viewed-, in Jingji Yangjiu (Economic Research), No.lO, (20 October 1989), pp.71-
76; translated in JPRS no.019 (8 March 1990), pp.8-13. 
2. For very precise information on the early stages of the development process in the SEZ, see for 
example: Clyde. D. Stoltenberg, wChina's Special Economic Zones", in Asian Survey, Vol.XXIV, No. 6, June 1984, 
pp. 637-654. 
Before outlining the principal goals of this research it 
might be useful to explain what is meant here by regional 
development strategy. Throughout this study, I have adopted a 
working definition used by Chinese researchers: 3 
Regional development strategy is an overall goal, policy, and 
tactic for local development, perhaps it could also be called a 
comprehensive guiding principle and mission. 4 
Because of its regional character and comprehensive nature, such 
development strategy calls for a certain degree of local 
autonomy. 5 More specifically, "the strategy of development is 
strategy which considers as a whole politics, culture, economics, 
society, and science and technology", or in other words "strategy 
for coordinated economic, political, scientific and technical 
development. u6 In the current investigation economic 
development strategy is associated with the progressive granting 
3. It is important to note that in the PRC, particular attention had been given to the question of 
regional development strategy since 1981. From that time on, symposiums were held every two months in different 
location; See for example: "Regional development strategy discussed ft , from Hohhot, Nei Menggu Ribao, (30 
January 1985), p.4, trans. in JPRS no.051 (5 June 1985), pp.40-43; For more detail on the meaning and scope of 
regional development strategies see: "Yu Guangyuan Addresses Meeting on Regional development", from Beijing 
Jingjixue Zhoubao (1 December 1985), p.l; trans. in JPRS no.002 (3 January 1986), p.9-10. 
4. "Discussion of Regional Development Strategy", from Beijing, Keyan Guanli No 2, (2 April 1988), pp.14-
19; trans. in JPRS no.038 (19 July 1988), p.lO-lB. 
5. It is important to point out that in the present study autonomy is taken in its Chinese sense, it is 
ft an attribute of any unit in a properly ordered administrative system, denoting its right and ability to 
fulfil its functions energically and without ·unnecessary interference." See: Falkenheil, Victor C. "Autonomy 
and Control in Chinese Organization: Dilem.as of Rural Adlinistrative Reform. ft In Organizational Behavior in 
Chinese Society, edited by Sidney L. Greenblatt; Richard W. Wilson and Amy Auerbacher Wilson, New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1981, p.192. 
6. "Discussion of Regional Development Strategy", trans. in JPRS no.038 (19 July 1988), p.13; for lore 
details on the concepts and characteristics of development strategy, see:-'Jingji Yangjiu' On PRC Development 
Strategy." frol Jingji Yanjiu, No 1 (January 1983), pp. 73-78, trans. in. JPRS no.324 (1 April 1983), p.l; see 
also: "Development strategy Studies, Regional Planning Examinedn , from Liaowang No 32, (12 August 1985), p.26, 
trans. in JPRS no.009 (27 January 1986), pp.1-3. 
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of the SEZ status to Hainan and the political development is 
equated with the elevation of the island to the provincial 
status. 
During this ten years period, Hainan island experi9~c8d very 
significant changes both in its administrative and economic 
organization. Administratively, its status changed from an 
administrative district under the direct authority of Guangdong 
province to a full-fledged province under the direct leadership 
of the central government. Furthermore, Hainan's administration 
was unified by the abolition of the Li-Miao Autonomous 
prefecture. Economically, the region was progressively allowed to 
implement special policies and to exercise greater decision-
making powers. Ultimately it was granted Special Economic Zone 
(SEZ) Status. These changes of the administrative and economic 
status of Hainan island are taken here as the most preeminent 
policies and tactics of the region's development strategy. 
Therefore, the primary goal of this study is to review and get a 
better understanding of this gradual and parallel transformation 
of Hainan island into China's newest province and largest SEZ. 
Because Hainan regional development strategy took shape and 
was applied within the PRC, a unitary state, 7 it also allows us 
to shed some light on the evolution of such strategy in the 
7. For example see: Joseph B.R. Whitney, China: Area, Administration and Nation Building. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago (Department of Geography, Research Paper No.123), 1969, p.3; ftAll states, of course, are 
confronted with great variations in the political relevance of different parts of their territory-and are 
obliged to come to terms with these when designing a system of the areal division of powers, but these dilemma 
are particularly crucial in the case of a centralized state like China in the process of transforming 
traditional society into modern ones. e 
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context of a centralized government system. As has been pointed 
out other researchers, "The problem of center versus region has 
bedeviled Chinese government for centuries. . ,,8 and n I n a 
traditional unitary state of great areal extent, such as ' China, a 
basic dichotomy having both functional and structural-areal 
implications is built into the system rendering it permanently 
unstable.,,9 Therefore we may anticipate that by exacerbating the 
tensions existing between the various administrative levels 
involved in the process, the designing and implementation of a 
regional development strategy should affect the delicate balance 
between regional autonomy and central control. 10 Thus , the 
secondary goal of this exploration is to attempt to measure the 
degree of influence the central (Beijing), provincial CGuangdong) 
and regional/local (Hainan) authorities had on the evolution of 
the region's development strategy. This should allow us to 
highlight the fluctuation between autonomy and control. 
8. Franz Schurmann. Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1966; He added:wThe Chinese Communist tried administrative centralization in order to bring 
about political unity in a country that had been disunited for fifty years. Administrative centralization 
achieved its aims, for it permitted the establishment of a uniform governmental system throughout China. 
However, administrative centralization created rigidities at the middle and lower levels of the system, which 
required a loosening up. This meant once again the acceptance of a difference between center and region.", 
p.213. 
9. Whitney, op.cit., p.73. 
10. On the difficulty of achieving the appropriate balance between autonomy and control, see: Whitney, 
op.cit., p.2; ".. • any political system must concern itself rather deeply with problems of its own 
territorial organization if it is to work with any reasonable degree of efficiency .•.• it must ensure that it 
has full control oyer those areas that are politically relevant to its successful functioning. In order to 
achieve such control the system is faced with a whole series of problems concerned with relationships between 
administrative areas, region, and regionalism, not the least of which is the degree of decision-making autonomy 
that should be allowed to each echelon of the hierarchy if it is to make the best use of the human and natural 
resources within its area of control." 
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In order to achieve these two goals this study has been divided 
into four chapters. The First Chapter provides a brief review of 
the evolution of Hainan's administrative structures from the 
first inclusion of the island into the Chinese State (Empire) in 
112 B.C. up to 1980. The three core chapter divide the ten year 
being examined into three temporal period, each corresponding 
with changes in the administrative status of the region. The 
Second Chapter describes the major events that marked the 
evolution of the strategy while the region was managed by the 
Hainan Administrative District Commissioner's Office. The Third 
Chapter III examines the principal episodes that influenced the 
unfolding of the strategy while the island was administered by 
the Hainan Regional People's Government. The Fourth Chapter 
considers the predominant events that distinguished the growth- of 
the strategy after the establishment of Hainan province/SEZ. 
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Chapter 1 
Historical and Administrative Background 
Introduction 
Divided in two sections, this chapter describes the gradual 
incorporation of Hainan island into the Chinese administrative 
system and offers general information on its progressive 
development. The first section will give an historical background 
including three principal sub-sections: the Early Period, the 
Modern Period, and the PRC Period. While the overview of the 
Early Period only summarizes how the Chinese have administered 
Hainan from their first occupation of the island to the fall of 
the Qing Dynasty, the brief discussions of the Modern and PRC 
Periods outline the principal developments to take place on the 
island from the proclamation of the Chinese Republic in 1912 to 
the launching of the reforms in the late 1970's. The second 
section offers an administrative portrait of the region in 1980. 
Historical background 
The Early Period (112 B.G. to 1911 A.D.> 
As early as the third century B.C. the Chinese were aware of 
the existence of Hainan island. Although not yet under Chinese 
administration, it was consider part of the Lingnan region which 
also included present day Guangdong and Guangxi provinces. By 112 
B.C. the army of Western Han (206 to 24 B.C.) occupied the 
northern part of the island, and throughout this period the 
isla.nd was named "Chu-yai ft (Shore of Pearls).! After the fall 
of the Han dynasty, the island was also referred to as "Hainan", 
(South of the Sea). 2 During the following centuries the Chinese 
had difficulties ruling the island. 
Due to uprisings and rebellions by the native people, 
Chinese administration of the island was only sporadic. 3 During 
the Three Kingdoms, under the Wu dynasty (222 to 280 A.D.), the 
8 
Chinese occupied part of the island. They abandoned it during the 
Jin dynasties (265-420 A.D.) and only partially restored their 
control during the Song dynasty (420-479 A.D.). The Sui dynasty 
(581-618 A.D.) was more successful and a larger portion of the 
island territory came under Chinese control. Renamed Chu-yai 
county, the island remained under Chinese administration until 
the fall of the Sui when once again the territory was abandoned 
for a period of time. Progressively, the Tang dynasty (618-907 
A.D.) reestablished and expanded Chinese control over the island 
and it came to be known as "Qiong" (fine jade). By the end of the 
Northern Song (960-1127 A.D.) the Chinese had consolidated their 
control over the whole of the island. But despite various 
experiences with various types of civilian administration, the 
1. Enderton, Catherine Schurr. "HainanDao: Contemporary Environmental Management and Development on 
China's Treasure Island." Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1984, p.101. 
2. Ibid., p.l02. 
3. During these repeated attempts at managing the territory, the Chinese used a variety of administrative 
appellations to designate the area under their direct control. At time these were administered as "fu" 
(prefecture), "zhou" (departments), or "xian" (counties or districts), at other time they were called ftlu" 
(military routes), and ftchun" (military zones). For more details see: Edward H.Schafer, Shore of Pearls. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, p.1-24. 
island remained primarily under military administration. 4 
By the ¥uan dynasty (1271-1368 A.D.) the entire island was 
under military administration. Renamed Qiongzhou Lu, it was 
d i v i de din t 0 S eve r a 1 n c h 1..1 n n. I t was the ;"'1 i n g d y n a sty <. 1 368 - 1 644 ) 
that reintroduced civilian administration on the island. It 
became known as Qiongzhou Fu, and the "chun" were changed to 
"zhou".5 The administrative structure of the island remained 
practically unchanged throughout the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911 
6 A.D.). 
Contact with the West 
9 
Although Europeans had been aware of the existence of Hainan 
th island since the 14 century, the first Jesuit mission was 
established only in 1632. From that time on, Portuguese and 
French Catholic missionaries preached on the island. In the later 
p&.rt of the 19 th century, they were joined by British i3.nd 
American Protestant preachers. This roughly coincided with the 
signing of the treaty of Tianjin which made Haikou a treaty port 
and formally opened the island to foreign trade. By . 1876 foreign 
traders were quite active on the island. The British and Germans 
had opened consulate on the island. The French were particularly 
interested in the region and in 1898 they obtained some guarantee 
from the Chinese government 'that Hainan would remained within 
4. Enderton, op.cit., p.102-104. 
5. Hans Liu. "Hainan: The Island and the People. w The China Journal, Val.XXIX, No.5, 1939, p.244. 
6. M. H. Honinger. Isle of Palm. Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1919, p.49. 
10 
their sphere of influence. 7 De<::p10te th f t ~ ese ac .. s, Western 
presence on the island remained minimal and only ten to twelve 
foreigners were reported living on Hainan in the early 1880s. 8 
The Modern Period (1912-1950) 
The Republican / War Lord Periods (1912-1939) 
After the fall of the Qing and the establishment of the Republic, 
Hainan island became part of Guangdong province. The Qiongzhou Fu 
Cl.dministration was Cl.bol ished and the existing "zhou" were 
downgraded to the rank of "xian". 9 Whi le these measures were 
being taken to place Hainan under Guangdong province's 
administration, the suitability of granting the island provincial 
status was being discussed. As early as October 1912, Sun Yatsen 
suggested such administrative changes. The idea of elevating 
Hainan island to the provincial level was brought up again in 
1921 and 1923, but the project was never realized by the 
Republican government. 10Nevertheless the territoriCl.l 
admi.nistration of the island was progressively reorganized and 
while there were thirteen "xian" (counties) in 1933, by 1935 some 
of those located in the center of the island had been redivided 
7. Enderton, op.cit., pp.lOS-l08. 
8. Donald L. Batkins. . "The Changing role of political conditions in the economic development of two 
Chinese regions: Hainan and Taiwan, 1895-1975. ft Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1979, p.41 • 
. 9. Liu, op.cit.,: p.244. 
10. Xu Shijie (ed.). Hainan Sheng: Ziran, Lishi, Xianzhuang yu Weilai. (Hainan Province: Nature, History, 
Present situation and Future). Beijing: ShangWu YinShuGuan, 1988, pp.346-47 .. 
11 
and the number of counties was brought ·to sixteen. 11 
Between 1911 and the Japanese occupation, which started in 
1939, very little development took place on the island. Although 
the first serious attempt at tapping Hainan's potential for 
growing tropical crops began in 1910, it appears that the 
overseas Chinese companies involved in these projects were not 
very successful. Similarly, attempts at establishing industries 
on the island also met with little success. One of the few 
venture which managed to survive more t.han a few years was a 
cannery established around 1920. It is reported that it exported 
small quantities of canned lychees and pineapple until 1931. 
Other sectors, such as mining and forestry, had not yet been 
systematically exploited. The island transportation, 
communication and social services system also saw very little 
imp r 0 v em e n t d u r i n g t his per i 0 d. 12 
Japanese Occupation (1939-1945) 
During their occupation of the island the Japanese developed 
various sectors of the economy and significantly improved the 
infrastructure. The iron mines of Shilu in Changjiang county and 
Tiantu in Yaxian county opened for production. In order to speed 
up their exploitation of these mines, the occupation forces built 
two railways. One from the Shilu mine to the western port of 
Basuo (Dongfang) and another from the Tiantu mine to the southern 
11. Enderton, op.cit., p.l14. 
12. Batkins, op.cit., pp.96-107. 
12 
port of Yulin. They also began the construction of the railway 
between Basuo and Sanya in the south. The ports of Haikou, Yulin 
a.nd Basuo were also expanded. In addition, the Japanese improved 
many highways and extended the existing road system to complete 
the_ round-the-island road. Small military airfield were 
constructed in Haikou and Sanya. They also developed radio 
broadcasting and installed telephone lines. Minor improvements 
were also carried out in social services, but these were more 
localized and less significant. Although they were interested in 
developing hydroelectric power, the rubber and forestry industry, 
and various other tropical crops, they did not have time to carry 
out these more ambitious projects. Throughout the six and half 
years the Japanese occupied Hainan, the island was under a 
mi I i tary government contro lied by the Japanese army. 13 
The Civil War Period (1945-1950) 
During the five year civil war that followed the Japanese 
occupation, the Chinese Nationalist government did not have time 
to implement the administrative reorganization and development 
plan it had designed for Hainan. Immediately after the Japanese 
pulled out the region was reintegrated into Guangdong province. 
But by 1947 the idea of granting the island provincial status 
- . 
resurfaced and in 1948 the Nationa'list government began to change 
the region's administrative status. 14 In 1949 the Hainan 
13. See: Ezra F. Vogel. One step ahead in China: Guangdong under reform. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1989, p.277; and Batkins, op.cit., p.l06-112. 
14. Xu, op.cit., p.347. 
Special Area was estab'lished and the island was removed from the 
control of the Guangdong provincial authorities. 15 A 
Preparatory Committee for the establishment of Hainan province 
was organized, but the Communist forces took Hainan before the 
new pro v i n c i et. 1 aut h 0 r i tie s we re est ab 1 ish e d. 16 
While various development plans were elaborated for·the 
region during that period, implementation had scarcely begun by 
the time of the Communist victory. Published in 1947, the plans 
focused on the establishment of agricultural plantations (rubber, 
coconuts, and sugar cane), irrigation and flood control projects, 
experimental farms and of hydro-electric plant. Apart itom the 
expansion of the agricultural processing industry, only minimal 
attention was given to the industrial sector. The exploitation of 
the iron ore mines was to be continued, but the iron and steel 
work industries were to be located in Guangzhou. The proposed 
plans were to be implemented with the help and protection of a 
large number of demobilized Nationalist soldiers. But due to the 
disruption created by the civil war, the authorities proved 
unable to carry out these plans. By the time the Nationalist were 
pushed out of Hainan island (May 1950), both the region's 
infrastructure and social services were in very poor 
d · t· 17 con 1 lon. 
15. Joseph, B.R. Yhitney. China: Area, Administration and Nation Bui/ding, Chicago: The University of 
Chicago (Department of Geography, Research Paper No.123), 1969, p.123. 
16. Xu, Opt ci t., p. 347. 
17. Batkins, op.cit., pp.112-116. 
14 
The PRC Period (1950-1979) 
Immediately after gaining control of the island, the 
government of the People's Republic of China returned Hainan 
under the administration of the Guangdong provincial gove,rnment 
and rapidly designed a plan to greatly expand the island's rubber 
production. In May 1950, the South China Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China established 'the Hainan 
M i 1 ita. r y and A d m i n i s t rat i ve C 0 ~ m i t tee. 18 Be for e the end 0 f the 
year, the Committee was ready to present the plans drawn up to 
organize the development and exploitation of the island's rubber 
industry. 19 The following year, in April 1951, the Commit.t.ee 
was abolished and the Hainan Administrative District 
Commissioner's Office of the Guangdong Province People's 
Cl 0 v ern men t ass u m e d the a d m i n i s t r a. t ion 0 f the i s I and. 20 T his 
designation of Administrative Region (between the prefectural and 
provincial status) was unique in the Chinese territorial 
administration's hierarchy.21 For the region this impl ied " 
. a special relationship with the national government which 
traditionally takes a more direct interest in Hainan's affairs 
than in the affairs of other sub-provincial areas." 22 
By that time serious efforts were being made to greatly 
18. Xu, op. ci t., p.123. 
19. Batkins, op.cit., p.124. 
20. Xu, op.cit., p.123. 
21. Vogel, (1989), op.cit., p.278; and Enderton, op.cit., p.l44. 
22. Enderton, Ope ci t., p.144. 
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expand the rubber plantations and rapidly develop the rubber 
industry. In 1951, more than twenty Soviet advisors arrived in 
the region. They were sent there to help with the mechanization 
and management of the industry. While there were Land Reclamation 
Bureau offices in Haikou and Dan counties, by 1952 the 
development of the rubber industry was coordinated from Guangzhou 
by the Central South Land Reclamation and Cultivation Bureau. 
That same year, 1952, a division of China's Fourth Field Army 
arrived on the island. With the help of civilian workers they 
began planting rubber trees. During the same period, the Chinese 
army also constructed the first road linking Haikou to Sanya 
through the centre of the island. This greatly facilitated the 
development of this mountainous area. 23 
While the development of the region's rubber industry and 
infrastructure were taking place, further modifications were made 
to the territorial adm·inistration of the region. In 1952, the 
island was divided in two by the creation of the Li-Miao 
Autonomous Area (district).24 Covering the southern portion of 
the island, the Autonomous Area included most of territories 
occupied by the Li and Miao minorities. Officially, it was 
created to protect the interest of these minorities. Although 
special privileges and policies were granted to the area, very 
few Li or Miao ever managed to reach high level positions within 
23. Vogel, (1989), op.cit., pp. 278-279. 
24. Xu, op.cit., p.l23. 
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its a d m i n i s t rat ion. 25 I n 1955, the A I.l ton 0 m 0 usA rea bee a. met h e 
Li-Miao Autonomous Prefecture. ~ 
That same year, the island adminstration was renamed the 
Guangdong Province's Hainan Administrative District 
C .. '0 - f . 27 A + h .. 1 . ommlSSloner s r lce. 5., e C1Vl lan economy wa.s being 
collectivised, the local Land Reclamation Bureau helped an 
estimated seventy thousand demobilised soldiers to settle in 
Hainan, thus furthering the expansion of the island's state farm 
system. The establishment of the Commissioner's Office and the 
growing power of the Land Reclamation Bureau probably helped 
strengthen the position of outside cadres. Apparently the local 
cadres resented the fact that mainlanders were progressively 
taking control of the island administration. 
1 n ana. t t e m p t tor 9 s i s t the " 0 u t s i d e r s ", the y r e g ~ 0 u pe d 
around the local leaders Feng Pai-chU and Ku Ta-ts'un. In 
December 1956, unable to control their frustration, some of the 
local cadres rebel led in the so-called Hainan Incident, but the 
army rapidly restored order. In late 1957, the Guangdong Province 
Party Congress severely criticized the "localist" attitude of the 
local cadres and launched a economic development plan for the 
island. By March 1958, the Hainan Incident was closed, and the 
central government had finally asserted its control over the 
25. Enderton, op.cit., pp.l36-l38. 
26. Xu, op.cit., p.l23. 
27. Xu, op.cit., p.l23. 
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r e g ion. 28 For the e i g h t f 0 I low i n g yea r s the a d m i n i s t rat ion 0 f 
the island was to remain unchanged and its development followed 
the national pattern. 
In 1966, with the launching of the Cultural Revolution, the 
Hainan Administrative District Commissioner's Office lost its 
power and stopped exercising its function. Two years later, in 
April 1968, the Hainan District Revolutionary Committee was 
established and the island was administered as a separate entity 
under a "unified leadership". This administration was to last 
eight years, until it was replaced by the Hainan Administrative 
D i s t r i et Rev 0 1 uti 0 n a r y Co m m i t tee i n 0 c t 0 b e r 1976. 29 Du r i n g t his 
ten year period, the development continued to be centred around 
the rubber industry. Progressively the Militatry exerted control 
over most of the region and took drastic measures to increase 
rubber production. These included the "sending down" (xia fang) 
of educated youth from the cities. Despite heroic efforts the 
rubber production did not significantly increase. In fact, in 
most cases the Military mismanaged the rubber plantations and 
s e r i 0 U sly d a ma g e d the r e g ion's en vir 0 n men t. 30 The r e for e , i t 
appears that the development of Hainan island did not progress 
significantly during the Cultural Revolution. 
With the establishment 'of the Hainan Administrative District 
28. For more details on the Hainan Incident of 1956-1957; See: Ezra F. Vogel, Canton under Communism. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969, pp.211-216. 
29. lu, op.cit., p.123. 
30. For a very interesting study of the impact of the Cultural Revolution on certain aspects of Hainan's 
development; See: Enderton, op.cit., pp.204-351. 
18 
Revolutionary Committee, in 1976, Hainan island was again placed 
under the jurisdiction of Guangdong Province. Therefore, by 1975, 
when the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee 
introduced China's new development strategy <reforms and open 
door policy), the provincial authorities had resumed their 
control over the region's development. By 1980, as the new 
strategy was being implemented throughout China and the first 
Special Economic Zones were being established, the Hainan 
Administrative District Revolutionary Committee was being 
replaced by the Hainan Administrative District Commissioner's 
Office, and the region's new development strategy began to 
emerged. 
Administrative Profile (1980) 
Before reviewing the principal events marking the initial 
stage of Hainan's new development era, it is important to define 
its administrative arrangements. The brief discussion of the 
administrative configuration co~ers two aspects of the issue. 
Fir s t , i t est a b lis he s the " re g ion' ". s po 5 i t ion wit h i nth e PR C 
admin"istrative hierarchy. Second, it describes the region's 
internal administrative divisions. These information will define 
the context of the elaboration of the new development strategy. 
Due to the PRC administrative hierarchy, the development of 
Hainan Island was subject to the influence of both Provincial and 
Central governments. On the one hand, according to the national 
administrative structure, Hainan Island was a region (district) 
under the immediate control of Guangdong province. Therefore it 
19 
is not surprising that the provincial authorities included the 
island in their coastal area development programme. 310n the 
other hand, the centralized nature of the PRC decision-making 
process provided the Central government with powerful control 
mechanisms. For example, the crucial role played by the State 
sector, various National Ministries and the Military in the 
exploitation of the island's resources allowed the centre to 
retain real power in its southernmost frontier region. As it 
shall be demonstrated the Beijing/Guangdong dichotomy played a 
decisive role during the formulation and implementation of the 
strategy. 
Halnan Administrative District 1980. ~~ft\l 
Fi gure 2 Hainan Administrative District, Adllinistrative Division, 1980. 
At th 1 al level, Hainan Administrative District was <J e oc 
divided in two overlapping ' jurisdictions (see Fig.2). In the 
· 31. The authority of Guangdong Province over Hainan is demonstrated by the inclusion of the island in a 
research on the development of the province'S coastal region carried out in 1980/1981. See: NFRB: 25 May 1980. 
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North, the Municipality of Haikou and nine counties were directly 
administered by the Hainan Administrative Region Government, 
located in Haikou. In the South, Sanya and Tongza towns (cities?) 
and eight counties were under the administration of the Li-Miao . 
Autonomous Prefecture Government, located in Tongza town. 
Although hierarchically under the authority of the Region's 
government, the Autonomous Prefecture was a relatively 
i n de pen den ten tit y. 32 
Summary 
Although Hainan island had been within the Chinese Empire's 
sphere of inf luence since 100 B. C. (Western Han), it was not 
until the end of the Northern Song (960-1127 A.D.) that the 
Empire consolidated its control over the whole of the island. 
Lasting for more than a thousand years, the progressive 
incorporation of the region to the Chinese Empire was marked by 
waves of occupation and followed by temporary withdrawals. The 
successive Dynasties that attempted to consolidate the power of 
the Empire over the southern island used both civilian and 
military administrations to control the region. While the entire 
island, named Qiongzhou Lu, was under military administration for 
most of the Yuan dynasty, the Ming dynasty placed the territory 
under civilian administration. Renamed Qiongzhou Fu, no 
significant changes were made to the region's administrative 
structure until the fall of the Qing Dynasty. 
After the proclamation of the Republic, the region was 
32. See JPRS-Car-90-056, 27 July 1990. p.52.; and Enderton, op.cit, pp.114-45. 
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placed - under the authority of Guangdong province and some attempt 
was made to accelerate its development. It is during that period 
that it was first suggested to grant Hainan provincial status. 
Soon the Japanese occupied the island, and for approximately five 
years the region was separated from mainland China. During that 
short period the Japanese were able to develop the island's 
mining industry and improve its transport and communication 
infrastructures. As the Japanese pul led out, the Nationalist 
government replaced Hainan under the authority of Guangdong 
province. But by 1947, the Nationalist government had made Hainan 
a Special Area, and soon began to work toward the establishment 
of Hainan province. In 1950, when the Communist government took 
control of the region, this administrative transformation was not 
yet completed. A similar fate awaited the various development 
plans that were drawn up by the Nationalists between 1945 and 
1950. 
Immediately after the Communist victory, the administration 
of the region was again returned to the Guangdong authority. 
During the following years, the provincial organization 
administerin~ the island was modified on several occasions. Thus, (:) 
in 1950, the island was managed by the Hainan Military and 
Administrative Committee. One year later, the Committee was 
replaced by the Guangdong Province's Hainan Administrative 
District Commissioner's Office. The following year, 1952, the Li-
Miao Autonomous Area (district) was established to manage the 
southern half of the island. In 1955, it became the Li-Miao 
Autonomous Prefecture. Although it enjoyed a certain degree of 
autonomy, the Prefecture was under authority of the District 
Commissioner's Office. 
Despite a local rebellion, this administrative structure was 
to remain unchanged until the Cultural Revolution. In 1968, the 
District Commissioner's Office was replaced by the District 
Revolutionary Committee which managed the island as a separate 
and unified administrative entity. But, by 1976, the Hainan 
Administrative District Revolutionary Committee was established, 
and once again the region became a part of Guangdong province. 
Throughout most of this period, 1950 to 1979, the 
authorities implemented various programmes to increase the 
region's rubber production and to realise local grain self-
sufficiency. But despite these efforts, in 1980, when the Hainan 
Administrative District Commissioner's Office replaced the 
Revolutionary Committee the island was still one of China's 
poorest and most backward regions. 
Chapter 2 
Hainan Administrative District Commisionner's Office 
(1980-1984) 
Introduction 
From January 1980 to October 1984, Hainan Island's 
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development strategy was radically transformed. Immediately after 
the replacement of the Hainan Administrative District 
Revolutionary Committee by the Hainan Administrative Distri~t 
Commissioner's Office, 1 the Central government announced its 
decision to speed up the development of its Southernmost frontier 
region. In the four years that followed this decision, Hainan 
island's new and distinctive development strategy emerged. The 
current chapter examines the various phases of the formulation of 
this strategy and focuses on the role played by the various level 
of government involved in this dynamic process. 
More specifically, the chapter is divided into five major 
sections. The first one presents the first attempt to redefine 
the region's development strategy and the attitude of the 
Central, provincial and local governments toward the suggested 
changes. The second section examines how the three levels of 
government influenced the early formulation process and sums up 
the findings and recommendations of a important study 
commissioned by the Central government. The third section looks 
1. Xu Shijie (ed.), Hainan Sheng: Ziran, Lishi, Xianzhuang Yu Weilai <Hainan Province: Nature, History, 
Present Situation and Future), Beijing: Shangwu Yinshu guan, 1988. p.123. 
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at how the Central, provincial and local leaders finally reached 
a consensus on the appropriate strategy. The fourth section 
describes the key components of the development strategy 
implemented in Hainan after March 1983. Finally, the fifth 
section briefly discusses the integration of Hainan into the 
Coastal development region and the establishment of Hainan 
Regional People's Government. A short summary of the analysis 
will conclude the chapter. 
The Embryo of the New Strategy 
There are some clear indications that following the 
establishment of the Hainan Administrative District, the Central, 
provincial, and local authorities were rethinking the development 
strategy of this frontier region . . The first sign that the Central 
government decided to speed up the development of Hainan Island 
is found in an article published in August 1980 by the national 
daily, Renming Ribao. 2 After summarily assessing the successes 
and problems encountered in the development of the island since 
liberation, the article presents an overview of what needed to be 
done in order to improve agricultural and industrial production. 
It points out that rapid improvement and expansion in the 
production of rubber and other tropical crops were the key to 
speed up the development of the region. It concludes by 
suggesting various measures that might be taken as the foundation 
2. ftFajun Hainan dao redai nongye ziyuan de youshi", (Bring the advantages of Hainan's tropical 
agriculture into play), in Renming Ribao: 9 August 1980, p.1 [hereafter RMRB1; and Nanfang Ribao: 10 August 
1980, p.1 (Hereafter NFRB1. 
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of the new strategy.3 
These days it is important to rely on the power of development 
policies, relax rules and fewer restrictions to enliven Hainan 
economy. We must give it greater autonomy in foreign trade, reduce 
the required amount of grain purchased by the state and increase 
the flexibility of agricultural by-products cooperative's 
purchase. Regarding the financial system, we must have the proper 
flexible power, smash the demarcation lines of the system, break 
the boundaries between different trade and between provinces and 
region. Giving these convenient conditions, (we should] 
simultaneously unite the operation of the economic units inside 
and outside the province, and improve the rubber plantation and 
other tropical produces, forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries in 
the many different agricultural, industrial, commercial 
enterprises on order to bring a state .of bal?-n~e management and 
create a diversified economy. 4 (translation supplledJ 
Reporting on the same subject, Nanfang Ribao, one of 
Guangdong Province's daily newspaper, thus outlines the key 
components of the new strategy proposed to accelerate the 
deve 1 opment of the is 1 and: 5 
The State Council (agricultural affairs) thinks that to resolve 
the problems of the development of Hainan Island, it is important 
to relax the policy on import/export trade, grain procurement, 
financial institution, industry and business profit retention. 
Thus the economy of Hainan will be enlivened, and will within 3 to 
5 years enable Hainan region to- experience a g~eat deyelopment, 
and increase the income of the masses. 6 (translation supplled) 
· The same article claims that, to accomplish its general goals, 
the new strategy had to simultaneously advocate greater autonomy 
for the region's authorities and better coordination at the local 
3. It appears that most of these decisions and suggestions discussed here where contained in the WState 
Council document No.202 ft , see: NFRB: 10 November 1985, p.l. 
4. Ibid., p.2. 
5. This is three years before the directive vas officially sent out, See: Ezra F. Vogal One step ahead in 
China: Guangdong under reform. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989, p.289. 
6. "Guowuyuan jueding jiasu jianshe Hainan dao·, (State council decide to speed up the development of 
Hainan), in NFRB: 9 August 1980, p.l. 
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level. 
To exploit fully Hainan advantages, ••• , we must give it 
greater autonomy over management systems and economic policies, 
and give greater consideration to the interest of the National 
Minorities living in the region ••. , we also must insist on the 
principle of the two roads of State and Collective sector,s. We 
must strengthen the economi~ cooperation between the State farms 
and the Collective. 7 (translation supplIed) 
Asked to comment on the new strategy proposed by the State 
Council, local leaders also viewed agriculture as the key 
element. After severely criticizing the previous leftist 
development line, they described the numerous problems the new 
strategy would have to resolve. For example, the Second Secretary 
of the region CPC and Director of the Commissioners' Office, Wei 
Nanjing identifies five major obstacles: (1).The relationship 
between tropical crops and grain production, (2).The relationship 
between the Land Reclamation bureau and the vi llages, (3)" The 
problem of crop distribution, (4).The problem of a balanced 
National economic development, (5).The problems of export and 
foreign trade. 8 Down-playing the calls for reform in foreign 
trade and greater local autonomy, this characterisation o~ the 
desired strategy is much closer to the one outlined in Renming 
Ribao. 
More details on the role and expectations of the Central, 
provincial and regional gover,nments may be drawn from a report on 
a special meeting convened by Guangdong province Party Standing 
7. "Guowuyuan jueding jiasu jianshe Hainan dao ft , (State council decide to speed up the development of 
Hainan), in NFRB: 9 August 1980, p.l. 
8. "Ba Hainan jiancheng redai zuowu de jidi", (To transform Hainan into the base for tropical agricultural 
products), in NFRB: 14 August 1980, p.2. 
Committee and held in Guangzhou from the 12 th to 18 thof August 
1980. 9 Present at the meeting were members of the provincial 
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Party Standing Committee and People's Government, Hainan Regi"on's 
Party Committee, and leaders of the Li-Miao Autonomous 
Prefecture. The discussion primarily centred on ways to improve 
agricultural production through the implementation of the 
reformed production policies. In this respect, the rapid 
development of rubber and other tropical crops was seen as the 
corner stone of the new strategy. The delegates also pointed out 
t hat the e x plo ita t ion 0 f Ha i n an' sad van tag e s Q. n d the s pe e din g. up 
of its development would only be possible if the central and 
provincial government provided greater financial and material 
resources. In addition a large number of policies concerning 
foreign trade, grain and finance were studied and formulated. 
Special attention was also given to the resolution of the 
contradiction between the State farms and the Collectives. 
Finally, it was seen to be necessary to expand the autonomy of 
all enterprises. " 
Based on the discussion presented above it may be possible 
to identify some of the characteristics of the regional 
development strategy that bBgan to surface during the summer of 
1980. First, it did not yet include a clearly defined program. 
Apart from the guarantee that the central and provincial 
government would provide a-specific amount of grain from 1981 to 
~. "Guanche Guowuyuan jueding, jiasu Hainan dao jianshe-, (Implement the decision of the State council, 
speed up the construction of Hainan), in NFRB: 25 August 1980, p.1; It is interesting to note that one of the 
chairman of that the meeting was chaired by fang Shang Kun. 
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1986, the strategy only offered a series of very general 
guidelines. Second, most of the poll"el"SS suaaest~d w~r~ sl"m" 1 
- ':) '=' Jr::; r::; r::; 1 o.r 
tot h 0 s e b e i n g imp I em e n t e d a t the n a t ion a I 1 eve I. T h i r d , its. t ill 
showed great continuity with the previous development era. 
Therefore we may conclude that while the formulation of a 
distinctive development strategy for the region had begun, it was 
still in an smbryonic stage. 
The Integrated Scientific Investigation 
Context of the Investigation~ 1981 
While the national strategy still overshadowed the emerging 
regional one, there were some indications that, by 1981, the 
drafting and implementation of a distinct strategy was gathering 
momentum. While the Administrative Districts's Party Committee 
was discussing and studying the State Council and the provincial 
committee suggestion on how to speed up Hainan development and 
establish "particular policies and flexible measures", the 
District Commissioners' Office and the various counties one after 
an other established foreign economic offices and trust 
companies. lO At the central level it was announced that the 
National Science Commission, the National Agricultural 
Commission, and China's Science and Technology Association had 
agreed to organize an integrated scientific investigation of 
Hainan is land during the fall of 1981. Including natural 
10. "Hainan yinjin waizi yewu huoyue-, (Hainan's imports of foreign investments and business is brisk), in 
NFRB: 14 September 1981, p.l. 
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scientists and economists, the inspection team was expected to 
provide a scientific basis for the rational development of the 
. , t . I 11 reglon s roplca resources. At the provincial level, it was 
announced that the Guangdong government had decided "to adopt an 
open-door policy for the development of tropical Hainan 
island.,,12 The announcement goes on to give precise details on 
the nature of the policies being adopted by the provincial 
authorities to develop the Administrative District. 
The provincial government plans to use foreign investment in the 
development of Hainan Island in accordance with the state external 
economic policy and unified planning of the province. Foreign 
trade and tourist industry will be expanded ... As far as income 
tax is concerned, foreign investors will enjoy preferential 
treatment as in the province's special economic zones of Shenzhen 
and Zhuhai. 13 
Not long after making this announcement, some members of the 
Guangdong provincial government and CPC Committee received the 
group of scientists sent by the Centre to carry out the 
integrated study mentioned above. For most of these scientists 
this was their first visit to the southern province. Addressing 
11. ftWo guo ziran kexuejia he jingji xuezhuanjia jiang dui Hainan dao jinxing zonghe kexue kaocha", 
(Natural scientists and econolists of the country will have an integrated scientific inspection on Hainan), in 
NFRB: 8 September 1981, p.l; The goals of the inspection are; to evaluate the damage done during the previous 
leftist period and make some recommendations on how to develop the island while respecting a balance ecological 
development. According to the article, the forest and nUBerous rare species have suffers drastic deterioration. 
It also indicates that the preparatory work for the inspection has begun in Septeaber, and will continue 
through the fall. 
12. "Guangdong adopt Open Hainan Policyu in JPRS: no.190 (79690) 21 Decelber 1981, p.20. 
13. Ibid. 
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the scientist, Ren Zhongyi,14 the Province's Party Committee 
First Secretary outlined the conclusions of the speciai meeting 
on the problems of developing Hainan island held in Guangzhou in 
1980. He explained that the meeting determined ft ••• that in order 
to rapidly develop and construct the island, it is necessary to 
promote development by means of the open door, and to let Hainan 
have even more decision-making power in order to proceed from 
actual conditions to carry out its own construction." 15 The 
research team left for Hainan the same day. Their conclusions 
were subsequently presented and discussed in a meeting held in 
Guangzhou in the Spring of 1982. Therefore it might be observed 
that while the centre was still studying how to rationally 
develop the island, the provincial government was moving ahead in 
granting the region a status similar to a special economic zone 
and the local level was creating the bureaucratic infrastructure 
to deal with foreign investors. 
The singularly aggressive position taken by both provincial 
authorities and Hainan administrators in the elaboration of more 
specific policies for the development and exploitation of the 
island was highlighted by a commentary by Yu Xinli, the Deputy 
Commissioner of the Hainan Administrative Commissioner's Office. 
Yu, who was responsible for the island's economic work was quoted 
14. Ren Zhongyi is responsible for the appointment, in 1982, of Lei Yu as Director of the District 
COlzissioner's Office and Hainan CPC Vice-Secretary. Both are native from Liaoning Province. They arrived 
together in Guangdong where they remained close associate, see: Vogel, Opt cit., p.289. 
15. "Dui Hainan de duo xueke zonghe kaocha ji jiang kaishi", (An integrated (scientific) inspection of 
Hainan will start soon) in NFRB: 22 November 1981, p.l. 
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as saying: 
The Provincial CCP Committee and government have decided to give 
Hainan more decisionmaking power. Hainan's external economic 
activities will be opened up still more, applying the methods of 
the Zhuhai and Shenzhen special economics zones. In this way 
Hainan Island will actually be implementing a special ecqnomic 
zone policy in a region that is not such a zone. 16 (emphasIs added) 
It would appear that the provincial and local levels were rapidly 
taking advantage of the greater autonomy given to them by the 
centre and were using the general guidelines provided by the CCP 
Cent~al Committee to elaborate a more specific development 
strategy for the region. 
As the provincial and local governments were busy opening 
the island to foreign trade and investments, the central 
government was still mainly concerned with resolving the region's 
internal contradictions. An article published in Renming Ribao in 
early February 1982, provides some indications on the centre's 
perception of the region~ It is suggested that three important 
points may be extracted from this article. First, by pointing at 
the dislocated environmental and economic imbalance created in 
the region by the previous leftist line, the analysis of the 
region's development problems are practically identical to those 
outlined in 1980. Second, the absence of any references to the 
use of foreign trade or investments in the development of the 
region is significant, especially in the light of the decisions 
taken at the provincial level only shortly before. Third, and 
perhaps even more significant for future development, is the 
16. "Hainan official on external economic activities"; JPRS: no. 194, (79807) 6 January 1982, p.75: Italics 
mine. 
intimation that a reform of the region's leadership system is 
imperative for an appropriate administration of the region's 
development. 17 S" th" t" 1 Ince IS ar lC e was presented as a summary 
of the findings of the previously mentioned integrated scientific 
inspection commissioned by the central dovernment 1 b , a c ass 
examination of the report of the inspection team might provide 
information on the forces which were shaping the region's 
development strategy. 
Report of the Investigation, 1982 
The publication of the "Investigative Report on Resources of 
Hainan Island" represented a turning point in the elaboration of 
the region's development strategy. 18 The first section presents 
Hainan as a promising frontier region and offers some of the 
reasons for its backwardness and underdevelopment. In the second 
section, the report summarizes the implications of the recent 
reforms and policies on the region's development. It states: 
Since 1980, the central authorities and the Guangdong Provincial 
Party Committee have laid down the policy of "promoting 
development by means of the open door," and have delegated fairly 
great authoritg to Hainan Island so that it can accelerate its own 
construction. 1 
This section addresses four fundamental issuess which had been 
raised during the implementation of the Open Door policy. These 
17. "Da kai bao dao de 'jin yaoshi' zai naIi?", (Where is the "Golden Key" to open the Treasure Island?), 
in RHRB: 2 February 1982, p.2. 
18. Liang Wensen, Shen Liren and Tian Jianghai, "Promote Development by Means of Open Door an Economic 
Investigation of Hainan Island" from Beijing Jingji Kexue No.3 1982, pp.37-42; trans. in JPRS: no.290 (82405) 7 
December 1982, p.24-36; [Hereafter the J Report J ]. 
19. Report, p.27. 
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issues were at the core of the region's emerging development 
strategy. 
Firstly, the section defined the primary goal of the new 
strategy, suggested how to measure its progress, and outlined the 
more specific goals of the Open Door policy. According to the 
Report, the goal of the new strategy was to develop the region's 
productivity so that it could progressively fulfil the growing 
material and cultural needs of its population. WAfter noting 
that the indices most commonly used to measure such 
'satisfaction' " ... are based on the people's average gross 
national product", it adds that according to rough estimates the 
island per capita GNP for 1980 was n ••• roughly a little more than 
300 yuan, or $200 slighly lower than the national 
average."21Linked to this general goal, were some of the more 
specific goals of the Open Door policy; absorption of foreign 
funds, importation of technology and increase in job 
opportunities. The researchers saw the achievement of these goals 
as crucial to the development of the region and warned that th~ 
achievement of these goals called for " ... a complete plan for 
everything. n22 They wrote: 
Without such a plan, we will not be able to proceed with 
comprehensive development or take full advantage of Hainan 
. t 23 Island's strong pOln s. 





Interestingly, they point out that ft ••• the district party 
committee has already envisioned a broad outline of the 
pIa n. ,,24 
Secondly, the section discussed the development of foreign 
trade. After explaining the crucial role played by economic 
exchanges with foreign countries in the recent national strategy 
for economic development, the researchers suggested that foreign 
trade was an extremely practical tool to build up the island 
economy. Furthermore, they pointed out that the formulation of 
the region's strategy for attracting foreign funds and developing 
foreign trade had to account for the island's predominant 
agricultural sector, weak industrial base, fund shortages, 
technological backwardness, fast-growing population and 
par tic u I a r po sit ion wit h i nth e n a t ion. 25 
Thirdly, the report reviewed the region's economic structure 
and explained how the opening of the island should draw from the 
procedure used in the special economic zones. While recognizing 
the usefulness of the approach taken to develop Shenzhen and 
Zhuhai, the report pointed out: 
In addition to the development of processing of imported materials 
and assembly of imported parts, the purpose of attracting foreign 
funds to Hainan Island is to exploit the natural resources, to set 
up areas for various subtropical crops, and to form processing 
enterprises as well as other related institutions which are, in 
depth and breadth, different from those in Shenzhen and 
Zhuhai. 26 
24. Report, p.28. 
25. Report, pp. 29-30. 
26. Report, p.30. 
More precise recommendations on how to create the proper 
conditions for the transformation of the economic structure 
followed. 
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This second section of the report concluded by offering 
suggestions concerning what should be the focus of the 
development strategy and the various steps necessary to achieve 
its goals. The document supported the provincial party 
committee's call for paying special attention to communications 
and forestry. The rapid establishment of direct links with Hong 
Kong and Macao were advocated. An aggressive program of 
reforestation and forest management was seen as a precondition to 
future agricultural development. Furthermore, the improvement of 
the region's infrastructure was viewed as urgent in order to 
attract foreign investment. The production of energy was singled 
out as one of the sectors which needed immediate attention. 
Intellectual investment was also perceived as urgent. In addition 
to the establishment of a regional university, the deyelopment of 
professional education and the recruitment of technicians from 
the mainland were recommended. 
The third and final section of the report contains the most 
valuable information on how the various levels of government were 
influencing the design of the emerging strategy. Explaining that 
it would be impossible to find internal sources for the huge 
amount of funds and equipment necessary for the rapid development 
of the region, the authors of the report cle~rly supported a 
strategy similar to that applied in the special economic zones. 
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In their own words: nln exploiting and constructing Hainan 
Island, we should basically rely on the use of foreign funds and 
imp 0 r t e d tee h nolo g y and set up j 0 i n t v e n tu res." 27 B y t a kin g 
this position they were giving some weight to the decision of the 
provincial authorities to grant such quasi-SEZ status to the 
island.~ The conclusion of the research team went even further 
in its support of the local authorities' demand for greater 
autonomy. Explaining why the delegation of power to the lower 
levels is necessary for the successful implementation of the open 
door policy they write: rt ••• the delegation of power to lower 
levels should be stricter on Hainan Island than in other ordinary 
areas. u 29 
Furthermore, it would appear tha.t the local leaders used the 
visit of the research team and the publication of the report to 
exert more leverage in the drawing up of the strategy. 
The comrades of the administrative district feel that although the 
policy decisions of the central authorities and the provinci~l 
party committee are good, there are difficulties in their 
implementation simply because the present system is not suitable 
for the open-door po I icy. 30 
Recommendations for re-organization 
After consultation with local leaders and inspection of the 
27. Report, p.33. 
26. See footnotes 12 and 13 for the decision of the Guangdong province cOllittee to grant Hainan 
privileges similar to those existing in its other special economic zones and the address of the province's 
party secretary to the research team. 
29. Report, p.33. 
30. Report, p.33. 
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region, the research team pointed at three issues which had to be 
considered when reorganizing the current system. First, they 
suggested that the economic relationship between the 
administrative district, the provincial authorities, and the 
central government be readjusted. While recognizing the negative 
impact of the previous leftist line on the region's development, 
the team acknowledged that the excessive appropriation of funds 
by the province and the centre were also responsible for the 
island's poverty and backwardness. The team observed that unless 
the local administration was able to retain the major portion of 
the surpluses produced in the region, it would be unable to carry 
out the various projects necessary to fully realize and implement 
the open-door policy. 
Second, they recommended that greater decision-making power 
be given to the administrative district in its economic relations 
with the outside world. They explained that the current 
distribution of decision-making power was creating contradictions 
between the local and' central auth~~ities~ As a~'example, they 
pointed out the refusal of various 'central' departments to 
recognize the administrative district's special open-door policy 
enacted by the provincial party committee. They outlined the 
decision-making powers reques.ted by the' district leaders to 
prevent such contradictions and enable them to fully implement 
the open-door policy. 
The comrades of the administrative district hold that in order to 
implement the open-door policy effectively, power for the locality 
in the performance of the following functions should be 
appropriately expanded, under the principle of 'united action in 
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dealing with other countries: Planning for imports and exports; 
undertaking economic cooperation projects; utilization of the 
share of trade and nontrade foreign exchange earnings; examination 
and approval of entry permits; and communications with other , 
countries. 31 
Some changes in organizational forms were also suggested. It was 
deemed appropriate to turn all specialized foreign trade 
companies into unified general local import and export companies 
under the independent management of the local authorities. 
Finally, the report called for greater cooperation between 
those enterprises which were under the direct control of the 
central government and the leadership of the administrative 
region. Rejecting the suggestion that all these enterprises be 
transferred to the leadership of the administrative district, the 
team of expert fully supported the Guangdong party committee's 
demand that, for every department, the district party committee 
establish local leading groups. While agreeing that these new 
district level economic departments be placed under the direct 
charge of the secretary of the district party committee, they 
emphasized the need to bolste~ its authority in terms of 
coordination and overal I planning. 32 
Responses from Provincial, Central and Local Leaders 
It appears that it took approximately one year before the 
various levels of governments involved in the elaboration of the 
strategy, arrived at a consensus. In January 1983, Liu Tianfu, 
31. Report, p.34. 
32. Report, p.35. 
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the secretary of the provincial CCP, mentioning the recent visit 
of Zhao Ziyang to the island, announced that the Party. Central 
Committee and the State Council had decided to give Hainan 
greater autonomy in its foreign economic relations, to implement 
a more flexible open-door policy and more relaxed domestic 
I ·· 33 B . po 1Cles. y dOIng so the central government basically 
approved the decisions taken at the provincial level in December 
1981 and subscribed to most of the recommendations made in the 
'Report' of March 1982. 
Following this announcement, the elaboration and 
implementation of a more detailed strategy for the development of 
the region is finally coming to light. Acknowledging that "Hainan 
Island is not a special economic zone", the fact that it could 
"adopt methods similar to those on Shenzhen and Zhuhai in some 
aspects and implement a policy of opening wider to the outside 
world in its economic activities with foreign countries" was now 
being discussed openly. ~In · an interview given to Nanfang 
Ribao, Lei Yu, ~aina~ .CPC Committee Vice-Secretary and Director 
of the District Commissioners' Office, outlined the current 
situation. After commenting on what had been achieved since 1978, 
he gave some indications on the nature of the policy being 
considered regarding foreign investments. He declared that income 
33. "Zhong yang jueding gei Hainan geng duo zizhuquan", (Center decide to give Hainan greater decision 
making power) J in NFRB: 23 January 1983, p.t; It is also interesting to note that the State Councillor Gu Mu 
accompanied Zhao during is visit to the region. See: "Hainan meeting on speeding up developmentftj in JPRS; 
no.329 (83281) 18 April 1983, p.92. 
34. "Wei le shiying duiwai geng duo kaifang de xuyao ft , (In order to meet the needs of greater openness 
to the outside world), in NFRB: 8 February 1983, p.l. 
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tax, land utilization and charges for labour were the main areas 
targeted by the new policy.~ Concerning decision-'making power, 
he pointed out that for investment project above 5 million US$, 
the Administrative District would have to obtain the 
authorization of the State Council and provincial 
go v ern men t. 36 
The increasing importance of the region for the central 
government and the seriousness of the currently defined strategy 
was demonstrated by an inspection of Hainan by Hu Yaobang, the 
General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee. During his stay 
on the island, he encouraged the local leaders and people to take 
full advantage of the more relaxed domestic policies and 
especially of the greater autonomy given to the region in its 
economic relations with the outside world to promote the island's 
deve I opment. 37 
As the central government was finalizing the adoption of a 
development strategy similar to the one adopted by the provincial 
authority in Decsmber 1981, the leaders of the Hainan 
Administrative District and Autonomous prefecture outlined their 
future tasks and expectations. For Lei Vu, Director of the 
Administrative District, the primary task was to attract foreign 
35. Some sources suggest that the special open-door policy to be granted to Hainan included a profit tax 
rate of 13%, or 2% lower than in the SEZ, see: Article in Wen Wei Po, 1 February 1983, trans. in JPRS: no.318 
(82989) 2 March 1983, p.80. 
36. "Hainan dao yi kaiiang cu kaifa", (Hainan island promoting development through openness), in NFRB: 8 
February 1983, pp.1-2. 
37. "Ren ren zhengxian gege fenfa ba bao dao jianshe de gengjia hongwei zhuangli R , (Everyone to play an 
active role in developing Hainan), in NFRB: 1 March 1983, p.l. 
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investment. While he acknowledged the importance of the more 
favourable policies being granted by central authorities, he 
stressed the necessity to improve both communication facilities 
and energy supply. For Miao Vice-Director of the Autonomo~s 
Prefecture, Li Guanglian, the new strategy offered a great chance 
for the eight counties of the Prefecture to reduce poverty and 
backwardness. He stressed that in addition to giving the region 
more autonomy, the provincial and central government also 
promised more financial and material help_ ~Hence we can see 
that both leaders welcomed the new tools being given to them to 
speed up the development of the region. 
Changing" Hainan Administrative status: First Consideration 
The month of March 1983 marked a turning point in the 
elaboration and adoption of the region's development strategy. 
While the full details of the new strategy, its special policies 
and regulations, and its specific plans and programs were still 
being worked out at the central level, the head of the District 
Commissioners' Office, Lei Yu was busy outlining what had been 
decided at the local level.~ At the provincial level, Ren 
Zhongyi, the First Secretary of Guangdong province CPC Committee, 
summed up the principles and policies concerning the development 
of Hainan in these terms: 
38. "Quan guo guanhuai bao dao, Hainan jiakai jianshe", (The whole nation concern about the treasure 
island, Hainan speed up development) in NFRB: 2 March 1983. 
39. "Hainan adopts preferential investment n frOD (Hong Kong) Ta Kung Bao, 4 April 1983; trans. in JPRS: 
"no.322 (83144) 28 March 1983, p.99. 
On the whole, we will promote the development of the island by 
carrying out an open-door foreign policy, and the development of 
the island wi 11 ·, in turn, support the carrying out of the open-
door policy. When carrying out economic activities with foreign 
countries, Hainan Island can exercise policies as implemented ' in 
special economic zones. W 
The province's first secretary also stressed the importance of 
having competent and dynamic leading bodies to carry out the 
principles and policies formulated by the Party Central 
Committee. He added: 
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In the future, the leading organs on Hainan Island will not be 
special agencies of the provincial organs. They will become first-
grade 'rea]' government which will lead the work of the island and 
wi 11 have very great decision-making powers. 41 (emphasis added) 
This is the first indication that the government is considering 
some major changes in the region's territorial administration. 
At the central level, on the instructions of the State 
Council and the CPC Central Committee, the leaders of various 
Central Ministries wete sent to the island to investigate. Among 
them were: the Minister of Agriculture Lin Hujia, the Vice-
Minister of Textile Industry Li Zhengguang, and representatives 
from the Ministry of Communication, ·Coal Industry, and Light 
I n d u s try. 42 As the i n v est i gat ion was pro g res sin g , the s tat e 
councillor Gu Mu convened a series of meetings attended by 
representatives of the relevant state Council's departments. It 
40. "Ren Zhongyi on development of Hainan" from (Shanghai) Shijie Jingji Daobao, 20 Harch 1983, p.2; 
trans. in JPRS: no.338 (83458) 12 May 1983, pp.112-114. 
41. I bid. 
42. "Hainan developmentS in JPRS: no.332 (83351) 27 April 1983, p.61; See also: sGuoWuYuan xuduo bumen 
fuzhe . tongzhi fenten di Qiong, wei Hainan dao kaifa jianshe chu IOU xiance ft , (Many responsible camarades from 
State Council's Ministries arrive in Hainan, they offer some advice on Hainan's development), in NFRB: 29 April 
1983, p.!. 
is important to note that the local leader, Lei Yu was twice 
requested to attend these discussions. The meeting studied, 
discussed and finally adopted specific measures to speed up the 
de vel 0 pm en t 0 f the r e g ion. 43 
43 
Conseguently, during a meeting held in Haikou on March 28 th 
and 29 th , and attended by the region's counties CPC committee 
secretaries and government chairman, the District CPC Committee 
and Commissioner's Office transmitted the latest decision of the 
State Council on the development and construction of the island. 
The District CPC committee Vice-Secretaries Lei Yu and Zhang Rihe 
told the local leaders that the State Council and its relevant 
Ministries had decided on a plan to help the region develop its 
energy, transport and communication, financial and agricultural 
sec to r s. 44 
With regard to the island's economic relations with foreign 
countries, it appears that the special policies granted by the 
central government to the region were fully in line with the 
43. These meeting at · the central level are mentioned in: "State to support Hainan construction N in JPRS: 
no.332 (83351) 27 April 1983, p.85; and "Hainan meeting on speeding development" in JPRS: no.329 (83281) 18 
April 1983, p.92. 
44. In the energy sector, Hainan will be granted lore coal, the Danxian county Changpo coal mine will be 
expanded and a new power plant will be constructed in its vicinity, and several small oil wells will be 
exploited in the northern part of the island. In the transport and communication sector, the rail link between 
Lingtoo, Basou and Sanya will be completed, the ports of Haikou, Basuo will be ext~nded, that of ~inglan 
improved and a new deep-water port will be constructed in Yangpu, the port of Sanya will be opened to foreign 
ship and sea route will be opened between Hong Kong and Haikou, direct air route will also be opened between 
Haikou, Sanya, and Hongkong, and a microwave communication circuit will be built. [n the finance sector, Hainan 
will get an additional 8 million YUan from the Ministry of Finance, a low-interest loan of up to 50 million 
yuan will be granted every year by the Bank of China and a low-interest foreign exchange loan of up to 50 
million US$ will be issued by the People's Bank of China. Finally, the sector of agriculture will get, along 
other ,things, an additional 50,000 tons of chemical fertilizers and 2,000 tons of diesel oil. For more details 
on the planned projects and programs see: "Hainan meeting on speeding development", in JPRS: no.329 (83281) 18 
April 1983, p.92-93; and "State to support Hainan constructiona , in JPRS: no.332 (83351) 27 April 1983, p.BS. 
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ten tat i v e pIa. n p rev i 0 U sly 0 uti i ne d by Le i Y u. 45 Mo r e 
specifically, the new regulations open the island to foreign 
businessmen interested to invest in joint ventures or wholly 
owned enterprises, in the various field of farming, animal 
husbandry, mining, forestry, as well as in factories. The 
regulations also stipulated that for these enterprises, no profit 
taxes wouold be collected for the first two years of operation. 
Starting in the third year a 15 % profit tax would be imposed. In 
addition, no taxes would be collected for five years, on the 
means of production imported for the construction or operation of 
these enterprises. Other policies and regulations similar to 
those existing in the special economic zones would also be 
imp 1 em e n t e d. 46 
The Core of Hainan development strategy 
Thus it appears that the core of Hainan Administrative 
District development strategy surfaced by the Spring of 1983. The 
combination of a fairly specific development plan and special 
policies provided the leaders of the region with very powerful 
tools to accelerate its socio-economic development. 
First reactions 
Reviewing the key points of the new strategy just sanctioned 
by the State Council and the CPCCC, Lei Yu also underlined two 
important factors which should greatly affect its implementation. 
45. KFavourable teras for Hainan Foreign investors", in JPRS: no.328 (83265) 14 April 1983, p.55. 
46. "Hainan's Lei Yu on development plan", in JPRS: no.342 (83524) 23 May 1983, p.81. 
45 
First, he mentioned the need to recruit competent personnel. He 
explained that in this respect , two important decisions had been 
taken, the establishment of Hainan University and the creation of 
preferential measures to enlist talented individual from the 
mainland to work on the island. Second, he stressed the need for 
a stronger and unified local government for the implementation of 
the strategy. 
In order to strengthen the island's unified planning, unified 
leadership and unified approach to external affairs, the State 
Council has agreed that Hainan can act as a first-grade 
government, and this proposal has been submitted to the National 
People's Congress for approval. 47 (ellphasis added) 
Echoing the previously quoted words of Guangdong province's CPC 
first secretary, Ren Zhongyi, this announcement indicated that 
the possibility of modifying the region's administrative status 
was being discussed at the highest level of government. 
In the latter part of May, the District CPC committee and 
administrators, the counties' party secretary and officials held 
a meeting to further study, clarify and implement the new 
strategy. 48 Guangdong pr6vince's governor, Liang Linggu~ng, on 
an inspection tou~ of the island, also attended the meeting and 
delivered an important speech. He told the participants that for 
the next 3 years they should concentrate their effort on 
improving the energy and communication sectors while 
47. "Hainan's Lei Yu on development plan", in JPRS: no.342 (83524) 23 May 1983, p.8l. 
48. The important role played by the governor in the elaboration of Hainan development plan is highlighted 
by some remarks made by Wu. Duotai, a CPCCC member and general manager of Hainan Island Enterprise Ltd. 
Explaining that he is in favor of the eight-point plan mapped out by Governor Liang, he declare that :ftThe 
state has turned Hainan into a special administrative region", see: "Hainan CPPCC Member discusses Region 
Deveiopment ft , in JPRS: no.360 (83816) 5 July 1983, p.l04. 
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progressively developing production in agriculture and 
for est r y. 49 A m 0 n g the 0 the rim po r tan t po i n t sdi s C 1J S S 8 d d u r i n g 
the meeting were; how to proper ly use the greater autonomy of' the 
region in its economic contact with the outside world in order to 
expand import and export trade, and how to properly expand the 
jurisdiction of Haikou City, the Autonomous Prefecture, and the 
other 'Han' counties. The meeting also took the 'preliminary' 
decision to divided the island into six economic subregions with 
their respective centres in Haikou, Sanya, Yangpu harbour, Basuo 
harbour, Wenchang and Tongza. 50 
Within a very short period of time, numerous actions were 
taken to implement various sections of the development plan. 
Rapid progress were being made toward the improvement of the air 
links between the island and the continent and between Haikou and 
Hong Kong. 51 More financing was being provided for development 
of agriculture, livestock breeding and welfare work. For example, 
the Guangdong Provincial People's Government and the Ministry of 
Finance were providing the Hainan Administrative region with 
1.85 million yuan to improve the economic and living conditions 
in its old revolutionary bases. 52 Financial aid from the 
49. The governor also called for comprehensive planing, and stressed the importance of rubber and of the 
joint development of its production by both the State and collectively run plantation, see: "Yao da hao jingji 
jianshe qifei de jichu ft , (Have to lay the foundation for econolic construction and development), in NFRB: 30 
Hay 1983, p.lo 
50. "Hainan lakai da guimo kaifa jianshe de XUIU ft , (The prelude to Hainan's large scale development), in 
NFRB: 3 June 1983, p.l. 
51. "Hainan air transportation to be improvedo, in JPRS: no. 340, 18 May 1983, p.6S. 
52. "Hainan state funds·, in JPRS: no.360 (83816) 5 July 1983, p.67. 
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central and provincial authorities was also made available to 
beg i nth e con s t r u c t ion 0 f ten key pro j e c t s. 53 
Summary of Central Document No.11 
By July 1983, the CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council were finally ready to publicized nationwide the decision 
taken in April and outlined in their "Central Document 
No. 1 1 " . 54 I n an' t t t' I b 1· h lmporJan ar .1C e pu IS ed simultaneously in 
the Renmin and Nanfang Ribao, the CPC Central Committe~ and the 
State Council gave some precise details about the nature of the 
new strategy selected to develop Hainan and exhorted the various 
Ministries of the Central government to provide immediate support 
tot her e g ion. 55 Mo re s pe cif i ca I 1 y , the c e n t r a I aut h 0 r i tie 5 
ordered its Ministries to provide labour, finances and material 
to the region. They also reiterated that the island now enjoyed 
generally more relaxed policies and a status similar to the 
53. "Hainan Island construction", in JPRS: no.353 (83716) 20 June 1983, p.41. More specifically these 
include: the exploitation of the Changpo open-cut coal mine, construction of 50 kilometres of railway to link 
Basuo and $anya, the expansion of Haikou city's three ports, the construction of the Yangpu deep-water port, 
improvement of postal and telecommunication services, the construction of a large textile factory in Haikou, 
the construction of Sanya and Haikou Guesthouses, the expansion and construction of numerous sugar refineries 
in various areas, the erection of the Wanning-Lingshui-Sanya power transmission line, and finally the 
construction of Hainan University. It is important to note that these project will be carried out by Central 
Government Ministries, for more information see: "Zhong yang ge you guan bu men dali zhichi Hainan kaifa 
jianshe", (Central government ministries are increasing their effort to help Hainan's development), in NFRB: 15 
July 1983, p.lo 
54. Also refered to as: " ••. the circular of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on the 
approval of the minutes of discussions on speeding up the exploitation and building of Hainan Island ••• ", see: 
"Hainan Leaders' meeting on Building Hainan", in JPRS: no.353 (83716) 20 June 1983, p.3-4. 
55. "Zhong gong zhong yang, Guowuyuan jueding, Jiakai kaiiang jianshe Hainan dao", (The Central Committee 
and State Council decide to speed up Hainan's development), in NFRB: 12 July 1983, p.1-3i and "Dang zhong yang 
guowuyuan jueding jiakai kaifang jianshe Hainan dao", (The Party Central Committee and State Council decide to 
speed up Hainan's development), in RMRB: 12 July 1983, p.1-2; It is extremely interesting to note that, for the 
first time since this question has been publicly discussed, the article is exactly the same in both newspapers. 
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special economic zones concerning its economic relations with the 
outside world. 
Beijing also defined the specific tasks of the 
Administrative District authorities. These included: the rapid 
development of agricultural productl"on ~nd l·t~ " b ~ ~ varIOUS su -
sectors, the improvement of the forest industry, the resolution 
of the energy and communication problems, the expansion of the 
region's industrial sector based on its natural resources, the 
expansion of foreign trade, the development of tourism, and 
finally the improvement of its educational and research 
institutions. 56 We can therefore assume that by mid 1963, a 
general consensus had been reached, and that the energy was now 
turned to the implementation of the selected strategy. 
The General Development Plan 
It seems that following this announcement, the 
implementation of the various projects and programs began in 
earnest. It appears that the Central government Ministries were 
busy working. rapidly on the expansion of the port facilities, the 
exploitation of the region's natural resources, and planning for 
the realization of the most pressing infrastructure projects 
outlined in the adopted development plan. 57 For example, a 
direct flight from Haikou to Hong Kong was inaugurated in the 
56. "Zhong gong zhong yang, Guowuyuan jueding, Jiakai kaiiang jianshe Hainan dao", (The Central Committee 
and State Council decide to speed up Hainan's development), in NFRB: 12 July 1983, p.1-3; and "Dang zhong yang 
guowuyuan jueding jiakai kaifang jianshe Hainan dao", (The Party Central Committee and State Council decide to 
speed up Hainan's development), in RMRB: 12 July 1983, p.1-2. 
57. "Zhong yang ge you guan bu men dali zhichi Hainan kaifa jianshe ft , (Central government ministries are 
increasing their effort to help Hainan's development), in NFRB: 15 July 1983, p.l. 
fall of 1983. 58 A regular air link with Hong Kong was scheduled 
to begin operate before the end of 1984. 59While the local 
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leaders acknowledged that these positive development were taking 
place, they continued to call on the rest of the country to come 
and participate in the development of the region. 60 From these 
various sources we gather that before the end of 1983, many of 
the key elements of the recently defined development strategy of 
the regions were being implemented and already there was· some 
sign of their impact. 61 
While the implementation of the general development plan put 
forward in the "Document No.ll" is progressing rapidly, the local 
leaders were working on the elaboration of a more precise overall 
plan. In November 1983, Lei Vu, hinted that the plan being 
considered would define the specific sectors to be developed in 
the six subregions <economic zones) delineated at the meeting of 
the local authorities held in May 1983. 62 It appears that by 
58. "Plan for Hainan Economic Development Outlined~, in JPRS: no.Ol1, 10 February 1984, p.75. 
59. "Hainan official on plans to develop Island", in JPRS: no.405 (84910) 8 December 1983, p.98. 
60. "Ba Hainan dao jisnshe de gengjia furao meilift, {Develop Hainan and let her get rich and lore 
beautiful),in RHRB: 8 December 1983, p.2; and "Xiyin waizi, yinjin jishu, xinban heying qiye", (Attrack foreign 
investment, Import advance technology, Set up enterprise with joint management), in RHRB: 8 December 1983, p.2; 
and "Fu Hainan", (Rich Hainan), in RHRB: 8 December 1983, p.2; This collection of articles summarizes the 
advantages and problems of developing Hainan, and points at the various task ahead. 
61. Here are some statistics for 1983: The region's gross output value reached 2.773 billion yuan for an 
increase of 10.7% over 1982. Of this, 877 millions yuan came from the industrial sector and the remaining 1.896 
billion yuan from the agricultural sector. The area planted with rubber tree reached 4.19 million mu by the 
end of 1983, or 200,000 mu more than the previous year. Sugar output is said to have reached 154,300 tons and 
afforestation to have covered 710,000 mu; see: "Hainan official discuss Island Development", in JPRS: no.020, 
20 Harch 1984, p.23. 
62. "Plan for Hainan Economic Development Outlined", in JPRS: no.Ol1, 10 February 1984, p.75-76. 
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May 1984, this more detailed plan had been formulated. It was 
announced that the I~land auth °to °  orl les were preparlng to set up a 
"unified development and construction company" with the 
responsibility of implementing the overall development plan for 
the en t ire i s 1 and, i n c 1 u din g the six e con 0 mic s r e g ion s. 63 
Centralization, Integration and Administrative Changes 
Hainan Island -Development' Company 
Immediately after this announcement, the Hainan District CPC 
Committee and Commissioner's Office disclosed the recent 
establishment of the Hainan Island Exploitation and Construction 
General Company. Three main tasks were assigned to the new 
company_ First, it may plan, guide or directly operate 
construction projects. Second, it should supervise and coordinate 
the introduction of foreign technology and capital. Third, it 
should exercise leadership over the Hainan Land Petroleum 
Exploitation Company, the Hainan Marine Products Exploitation 
Company, the Hainan Electric Products Exploitation Company, the 
Hainan Aviation Service Company, . and other specialized and branch 
companies. Lei Yu, director of the commissioner's office and Yao 
Wenxu, Secretary of the District CPC committee were respectively 
appointed Vice-Chairman and Chairman of the Board of 
directors.~ The creation of this company demonstrates the 
63. "Lei Yu on Development of Hainan Island", in JPRS: no.054 2 July 1984, p.69; See also: "Hainan 
official discusses development Plan", in JPRS: no.049 21 June 1984, p.14. 
64. These are some of the important leaders involved in the company: the deputy secretary of the district 
CPC committee, Heng ~ingping, is appointed general manager; the deputy director of the district cOlaissioner's 
office, Chen Yuyin, and the general secretary of the district commissioner's office, Chen Yinghao, are 
appointed assistant general managers; see: "Hainan CPC sets up construction company", in JPRS: no.048 20 June 
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growing power of the local leaders over the development of the 
region and the beginning of the centralization of the region's 
administration. 
The Coastal Development Belt 
As the Administrative District government was taking 
specific measures to implement the regional development strategy 
defined in "Central Document No.ll", the Central government was 
formally integrating the region into the Coastal Region and 
changing its administrative status. In April 1984, only one year 
after Hainan development strategy had been spelled out, the 
Central government announced that the island and 14 coastal 
cities would be allowed to implement some of the policies granted 
tot he 4 SE Z 0 f She n z hen, Z h u ha i, S h ant 0 U and X i a men. 65 By 
including Hainan Administrative District among these open coastal 
areas, the Central government finalized the incorporation of the 
Hainan into the Coastal development belt and thus enhanced the 
imp 0 r tan c e 0 f the i 5 1 and. 66 
Change of Hainan Administrative Status 
Furthermore, in May 1984, the Second Meeting of the Sixth 
National People's Congress decided to abolish the Hainan 
Administrative District Commissioner'S Office and replace it by 
1984, p.70. 
65. "Opening 14 Cities to outside' Important' Step", in JPRS: no.043 6 June 1984, p.18-19. 
66. For more details, see: "Oi liu ceng Quan Guo Ren Da di er ci huiyi", (The Second Heeting of the Sixth 
National people's Congress), in NFRB: 2 June 1984, p.t-3. 
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This certainly represented an important modification of the 
region's administrative status and may be interpreted as the 
first step toward the recognition of Hainan as a full-fledged 
province. Both decisions demonstrate that, by 1984, the Hainan 
island development strategy had become one of the important 
element of the National development strategy. 
Summary 
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During the four years covered by this chapter, Hainan 
Administrative District was endowed with a distinctive 
development strategy. The evidence presented here suggests that 
the favored strategy was not dictated by the Centre, but rather 
was shaped through the complex interaction between the Central, 
provincial and local authorities. The degree of influence of the 
three levels of government involved in the process varied as the 
strategy took shape. I t is . suggested that the fluctuation in the 
degree of influence each levels o ,f government had on the emerging 
strategy may be highlighted by dividing the period in five 
different phases. 
Phase 1 
The Central government launched the first phase of the 
process. In July 1980, the State Council announced its decision 
to speed up the development of the region. Its "State Council 
document No.202 ft contained the blueprint for the region's new 
67. Xu, Ope cit., p.123-124. 
development strategy. Focusing on the agricultural sector, the 
State Council outlined the general guidelines to be followed by 
the provincial and district authorities in implementing various 
reforms. More importantly, it also indicated that greater 
autonomy should be granted to the authorities of the region. 
While there were no signs that Guangdong province resented this 
decision, it appears that it was more interested by the rapid 
expansion of the district foreign trade than in the development 
of its agriculture. The district authorities also responded 
positively to the suggested "plan but warned of the numerous 
problems to be resolved before the region's development could 
really takeoff. While the Central government controlled this 
first phase of the process, some of the proposed reforms 




It is during the second phase of the process that the 
Guangdong province government and the District Commissioner's 
Office began to play a greater role. As the Central government 
sent a team of experts to the island to study how to accelerate 
the development of the region, Guangdong province announced its 
decision to open the district to foreign investment. The district 
leaders used the investigation to ask for more autonomy and 
preferential policies. The recommendations of the comprehensive 
study carried out by the team of experts clearly reflected the 
decision of the provincial authorities and the demands of the 
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district leadership. Therefore, it may be suggested that during 
1981 and 1982, Guangdong province exerted a great influence on 
the formulation process, while the District Commissioner's O~fice 
began to act as a more autonomous administrative entity. 
Phase 3 
By late 1982 and early 1983, the process entered its third 
phase and the new director of the Commissioner's Office, Lei Yu, 
became a prominent figure. Supported by his mentor, Guangdong 
province's Governor, RenZhongyi, he worked hard to promote the 
interests of the region. In the few months preceding the 
introduction of the new strategy, Lei Yu lobbied for more 
preferential policies and greater decision-making power. Thus, as 
the three levels of government and their various agencies and 
ministries are working out the final consensus, the region began 
asserting itself and apparently played a very active role in the 
drafting of its own development strategy. 
Phase 4 
In March 1983, the CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council finally endorsed a new strategy for the development of 
the region. This marked the beginning of the fourth phase. The 
details of the selected strategy were included in "Central 
Document No.ll". Although they were not made public before the 
Summer of 1983, the special measures and policies granted to the 
region rapidly produce some results. The three levels of 
government immediately set to work, and before the end of 1983, 
the ' region had experienced numerous improvements. While the 
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support of both central and provincial agencies were crucial for 
the realisation of the development plan, the leadership of the 
region progressively emerged as a true power centre and started 
to work on a more comprehensive overall development plan. 
Phase 5 
Only the regional and central authorities were involved in 
the fifth phase. As the District CPC Committee is busy 
establishing the Hainan Island Exploitation and Construction 
General Company, the Central government announced that Hainan 
Island and 14 coastal cities were to enjoy preferential 
treatments concerning their relation with the outside world. 
During the same period, the Second Meeting of the Sixth National 
People's Congress announced that by October 1984, the Hainan 
Regional People's Government would assume the administration of 
the island. The institution of the Regional People's Government 
may be said to reflect both the .greater centralization of the 
district administration revealed by the creation of the "General 
Company", and the better integration of the region into the 
national development strategy demonstrated by its incorporation 
into the coastal development belt. 
Therefore, by the end of 1984, Hainan Administrative 
District had almost become a provincial level government and a 
Specia.l Economic Zone. While the region new governmental 
organization and special economic privileges reflected the 
region's new development strategy, they also placed it in an 
ambiguous position within the national administrative hierarchy. 
Although still under the jurisdiction of Guangdong province, 
Hainan Administrative District enjoyed great decision-making 
power. Not a full-fledged province, it did not yet have direct 
links with the Central government. Consequently, it may be 
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suggested, that by rapidly increasing the autonomy of the 
Administrative District the selected strategy had greatly 
weakened the capacity of both provincial and central authorities 
to control the development of the region. Before long, the full 
impact of the region's equivocal administrative and economic 
status would be felt. 
Introduction 
Chapter 3 
Hainan Regional People·s Government 
(1984-1988) 
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This chapter examines the evolution of the strategy from the 
establishment of the Hainan Regional People's Government, which 
replaced the Hainan Administrative District Commissioner's Office 
in October 1984, to the creation of Hainan Province in April 
1988. 1 During this period, the evolution of the region's 
development strategy may be divided into three different stages. 
The first stage was marked by the unfolding of the Car Incident. 
It ended in early August 1985. The second stage concerned a 
process of reevaluation and readjustment that lasted from August 
1985 to August 1987. Zhao Zhiyang's visit to the region was the 
key event of ' this -period. Finally, the third stage was 
characterized by major changes. Encompassing the progressive 
establishment of Hainan Province SE~, it lasted from late August 
1987 to ear ly 'Apri I 1988. Examining these three stages in some 
detail, this chapter attempts to shed some light on how and why 
the region became a Province and a Special Economic Zone. 
The Car Incident, 1984-85 
The Context 
During the first eight months following the establishment of 
1. Xu Shijie (ed.), Hainan Sheng: Ziran, Lishi, Xianzhuang Yu Weilai (Hainan Province: Nature, History, 
Present Situation and Future), Beijing: Shangwu Yinshu guan, 1988. p.123. 
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the Hainan Regional People's Government, Hainan's development 
strategy remained practically unchanaed. In addl'tl" d 't th b J on, espl .. 9 J e 
dissolution of the Commissioner's Office, its former directo~, 
Lei Yu was stil I the "principal responsible person of the 
regional government. ,,2 During a.n inspection tour of the island 
in late January 1985, Wang Li, Vice-Premier of the State Council 
and member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party, reiterated the key points of the 
3 strategy to be implemented at that stage. 
Wang repeated that the region had to concentrate its energy 
on exploiting its special advantages, namely the development of 
its tropical and subtropical agricultural products, he further 
guaranteed the island's grain supply. He also strongly encouraged 
the region to develop its processing industries, but warned 
against any attempt to establish inappropriately large processing 
industry. He stressed the importance of the cooperation between 
the different sectors of the economy, the different ethnic 
groups, and the various level of government for the development . 
of the island. 
He also emphasized the need to improve the infrastructure in 
the sectors of transportation, energy supply, communication and 
2. "Lei Yu talks to Thai Chinese on investment", in JPRS: no.68 30 July 1985, p.138. 
3. "Wan Li tongzhi lai wo qu shicha dui jiakai Hainan kaifa jianshe zuo le zhongyao zhishi", (Comrade Wan 
Li made sose important recommendations when he came to my region to inspect the speeding up of Hainan 
development and construction), in HNRB: 29 January 1985, p.l [hereafter Hainan Ribao); and "Rang bao dao duo 
chu bao kuai chu bao", (Let the treasure island rapidly produce more treasure), in RHRB: 29 January 1985, p.l; 
see also: "Bao dao yao fahui 'bao' zi he 'dao' zi zuo yong", (The treasure island must take advantage of its 
treasures and its insularity), in NFRB: 29 January 1985, p.l. 
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tourism. Among these, he saw as crucial, the rapid expansion of 
electric power production capacity, the enlargement of the 
facilities for sea transportation and the development of the 
service industry. This contrasted with opinions expressed ,at the 
local level calling for rapid expansion of foreign trade and 
investment. 4 . 
The Facts 
What came to be known as the Car Incident was 'triggered by 
Hainan's importation of motor vehicles and other consumers items 
and their illegal rasel ling to mainland China. From early January 
1984 to early March 1985, the district's leading cadres approved 
the importation of 89 thousand motor vehicles, more than 2.8 
million television sets, 252 thousand videotape recorders, and 
more than 120 thousand motorcycles. Most of these were to be sold 
on the continent. S While these numbers give us an idea of the 
dimension of the operation, a closer look at the chain of events 
should help clarify the role played by local leaders and the 
response of the central and provincial authorities. 
Role of Hainan's Leaders 
According to the report, approval for the importation of 
these items began to be granted in January 1984. In the fol lowing 
4. -Hainan jingji qifei wenti de tantao ft , (Inquiry into some problems of Hainan's econoaic take-off), 
HNRB: 28 January 1985, p.2. 
5. ftHainan dao daliang jinkou he dao.ai qiche shijian zhenxiang ' dabai", (The truth has been brought to 
light about Hainan island importation and reselling of a large number of cars incident), in RMRB: 1 August 
1985, p.1; NFRB: 1 August 1985, p.1-2. 
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six months, more than 2,300 cars and a large quantity of the 
other items were delivered to the island. The investigators also 
unveiled, that during this same period, the district's cadres and 
government leaders were busy encouraging their branch companies 
to participate in this lucrative business. It is clear that these 
various business organizations responded positively to the 
suggestions of their leaders, since, by June, the Administrative 
District's affiliated companies and trusts provided the local 
government with more than 100 million yuan in profit. 
In fact, it is important to remember that before the end of 
May 1984, the District epe Committee and Commissioner's Office 
set up the Hainan Island Exploitation and Construction General 
Company. 6 Although not specifically mentioned in the final 
report, there is good reason to believe that this company played 
a leading role in the incident. For example, it was the two 
assistant general managers of this company, Chen Yuyin (the 
deputy director of the district commissioner's office) and Chen 
Yinghao (the general secr.etary of the district commissioner's 
office) who, in August 1984, went to Hong Kong to sign the 
contract for the importation of the motor vehicles. By that time, 
approval had been given for the importation of 13 thousand 
vehicles. 
Awareness of Central Authorities 
Although the importation and reselling scheme was not halted 
6. See: Chapter 2, p.51(check). 
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until March 1985, central government agencies were aware of the 
P roblems since the middle 1984. At the ~nd of J 1984 J J  une , the 
State Council Special Economic Zones Office phoned the island 
leadership and criticized certain of its importation and 
reselling practices. In late September, the same Office sent a 
team to Hainan to clearly explain the nature of the infractions 
that the region's administration were committing. The team 
discussed the question with Yao Wenxu, Lei Vu, and Chen Yuyin, 
who claimed that they had recently stopped approving the 
importation of vehicles. But in fact, they had not done so, and 
before the middle of October they had approved the importation of 
an additional 8.5 thousand vehicles. 
During the month of November, the State Council Special 
Economi Zones Office phoned Lei Yu and Chen Yinghao on numerous 
occasions. They warned the local leaders of the seriousness of 
the mistakes they were committing and ordered them to take 
immediate measures to stop the importation scheme. In a report 
presented to the State Council Special Economic Zone Office at 
the end of November, the local government claimed that, to that 
day, most of the imported vehicles remained on the island. This 
report was signed by Lei Yu and seen by Yao Wenxu. In another 
report presented to the same office on November 30 ~ Lei Yu did 
not refer to the selling of cars outside the island, but simply 
announced that in early September the District government had 
decided to stop the importation of vehicles for 1984. 
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Hainan Authorities take action 
Despite these numerous warnings by the State Council it 
appears that the regional authorities did not take specific 
measures until March 1985. It was only two months after the visit 
of Vice-Primier Wan Li that the local government finally acted to 
correct the situation. On March 21t~ the Hainan People's 
Government announced the results of an investigation into the 
management of one hundred and sixty seven companies established 
by various party and government organizations. 7 Resulting from 
the investigation. nineteen companies were left intact, ten were 
consolidated, and one hundred and thirty-eight were abolished. 
The twenty-nine companies kept operating were all detached from 
party or government organizations. Interestingly the Hainan 
Island Construction and Development Corporation established by 
the District Party Committee and managed by its key leaders was 
among those companies cleared by the investigation. 8Although 
no reference to the Car Incident was made at the time, it seems 
quite clear that this investigation and the resulting closures 
were directly related to the incident. 
The result of this investigation did not immediately affect 
the composition of the region's party and government apparatus. 
At the lowest levels, most cadres involved in the abolished 
7. "Hainan yi bai liu shi qi ge gongsi dabu chexiao", (Most of Hainan's 167 companies are abolished), in 
NFRB: 22 March 1985. 
8. It is interesting to note that of the 76 companies and business established by departments directly 
under the Hainan District Party COllittee and Government, 50 were closed down; of the 47 companies directly 
under the Autonomous Prefecture, 34 were fold up; and all of the 44 companies under Haikou municipal government 
and Party Committee were abolished: Ibid. 
companies returned to their original tasks and units. 9 At the 
higher levels, Lei Yu was stil I presented as the region's key 
leader as late as the middle of June. 10The only indication of 
the changes to come was the greater role played in the 
administration of the region, by Meng Qingping, the deputy 
secretary of the CPC Committee. 11 
The Central Authorities Investigate 
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Even though Hainan Regional People's Government authorities 
had finally stopped the importation of vehicles and taken action 
to punish or reorganize the numerous companies involved in the 
scheme, higher authorities were not satisfied. Within two months, 
a joint team including members of the CPPCC's Discipline 
Inspection Commission, the state Economic Commission and other 
government bodies went to Hainan for a full scale 
i n v est i gat ion. 12 
As the investigation progr~ssed, the central authorities 
appea.red to be making some concessions. In June, it was announced 
that the Ministry of Commerce had issued a document allowing 
Hainan to sell to mainland China seven imported commodities 
ordinarily controled by the cental government. 13Since these 
9. See note 6. 
10. "Lei Yu talks to Thai Chinese on investment", in JPRS: no.68 30 July 1985, p.138-139. 
11. ftHainan meeting reviews economic achievements, tasks", in JPRS: no.060 9 July 1985, p.21. 
12. Chang Chen-pang. "The Hainan Vehicle Trafficking Scandal", in Issues & Studies, Vol.21 No.9, September 
1985, p.5-7. 
13. "Hainan to sell imported commodities", in JPRS-CEA-85-075 (19 August 1985), p.120. 
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included television sets, videotape recorders, and motorcycles, 
it seemed that the Beijing authorities were approving a 
significant portion of Hainan's trade activities. But the 
importation and reselling of motor vehicles was not included in 
the document, therefore the region was still not off the hook. 
Findings of the Investigation 
The joint inspection team finally reached its conclusion, 
but at least two important meetings were held in Hainan before 
the report was made public. At the first meeting, held on July 21 
1985 and attended by the leading cadres of the departments 
directly under the Hainan Administrative District, the higher 
authorities justified the upcoming crackdown. 14 To those who 
claimed that given the poverty of the region, the violation of 
regulations was somewhat justified and should be treated 
leniently, the authorities explained that the region had already 
been given special consideration and relaxed policies. To those 
who saw the incident as a minor fault, the higher authorities 
replied that given the numbers involved, the lenght of time it 
lasted and the great impact it had on the rest of the country, 
the incident was a very serious mistake. In addition, they 
explained that although most leading cadres involved did not 
personnaly profit from the incident, they could not be forgiven 
14. ftZai Hainan xingzhengqu zhishu jiguan buweiban yishang lingdao ganbu huiyi shang de jianghua", 
(Speeches at the meeting for leading cadres of subordinated departments of Hainan Administrative Region), NFRB: 
4 August 1985, p.I-2; The fact that this summary of this meeting was only published after the 'Official Report' 
was made public and nearly two after the meeting was held demonstrate the complex maneuvering of the various 
levels of government involved. 
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and that three senior leaders would be punished. However, they 
stressed that the overall policy for the development of Hainan 
island would not be greatly affected by the incident. The va~ious 
concerns addressed at this meeting clearly demonstrate that many 
of the local cadres were resisting the findings of the 
investigation and unhappy about the disciplinary actions to be 
taken,. 
A few days later, a second meeting was held where the cadres 
and leaders of the region studied two important documents dealing 
with the Car Incident. Held in Haikou, from the 24 th to the 26 th 
of July 1985, this Enlarged Meeting of the Hainan Regional Party 
Committee Standing Committee was attended by more than 500 
people. 1S Contrary to the previous meeting there were no signs 
of resistance to the decision of the higher authorities. The 
participants approved both the "Report of the Investigation into 
Haina.n's Importation and Resell ing of Vehicles· and Other I terns" 
prepared by the joint-investigation team, and the "Decision on 
the Disciplinary Action Taken Against Lei Vu, Yao Wenxu, and Chen 
Yuyin for their Participation in the Car Incident" drafted by the 
Guangdong province Party Committee. The meeting concluded that a 
hard lesson had been learned but that the development of the 
region was still promising. 
Period of Reevaluation, 1985-87 
The first of August 1985, the report on the 'Hainan island 
15. "Hainan dao kaifa he jianshe da you xiwang", (There is great hope for Hainan island development), in 
NFRB: 2 August, 1985, p.l. 
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Car Incident' of the CPPCC's Discipline Inspection Commission, 
the State Economic Commission and other governmental bodies was 
made public. While many individuals and organizations both within 
and outside the region were blamed for the l'n~l'dent L' v \.., ~,e1 ,,1.1, the 
region's key leader for the previous three years, was dismissed 
from his position as deputy secretary of the Regional Party 
Commit.tee a.nd head of the Regional People ', s Government. 16 His 
fellow deputy secretary, Meng Qingping, 17 replaced him as head 
of the Regional People's government and thus became the region's 
. - ~. . 1 18 ,... . h . senlor ottlcla. ~lnce e retalned this key position until the 
the appointment of the Province's Preparatory Group, in September 
1987, Meng Qingping managed the region for the period of 
t r B. n sit ion. 
Although there were some signs that the reorganized 
leadership was trying to slow down certain aspects of the 
development process, it appeared that the favourable policies 
were to remain unchanged. In early September 1985, the Standing 
Committee of Hainan Regional CPC Committee called an enlarged 
16. ftZhongYang pizhun zhongjiwei ji Guangdong shengwei deng danwei de diaocha baogao W, (Central Government 
authorized the Inspection Report of the Central discipline inspection commission, GuangDong Province Committee, 
and other units), NFRB: 1 August 1985, p.l; and "Hainan dao daliang jinkou he daomai qiche shijian zhenxiang 
dabaift, (The truth has been brought to light about Hainan island importation and reselling of a large number of 
cars incident), in RHRB: 1 August 1985, p.l. 
17. "Heng Qingping, age 49, is froll Heishan in Liaoning Province. He was transferred to ~ork in Hainan's 
iron mine in 1961. He has worked as a miner. teacher, technician, engineer, deputy director of the iron mine. 
Three year ago, he was transferred from Hainan's iron mine to work in the government of the Hainan 
administrative region, and he was second only to Lei Yu."; see "Hainan's Heng Qing Ping interviewed on 
development plans", in JPRS: no.055 6 Hay 1986, p.16-17. 
18. "Hainan open policy said still in force", in JPRS: no.086 25 September 1985, p.7-8; and "Hainan's Heng 
Qing Ping interviewed on development plans", JPRS: no.055 6 Hay 1986, p.16. 
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meeting to tf • draw lessons from the car incident. " and 
" make clear the principles guiding the development of the 
i s 1 an d. " 19 The me 8 tin g ex pIa i ne cl t ha. t the ex C 85 S i ve use 0 f 
trade to maintain an unrealistically high growth rate in ~conomic 
development, which had characterized the region's development 
strategy since the middle of 1984, was not in line with the 
spirit of Central document No.ll and the strategy delineated for 
the region in 1983. W The meeting advocated a return to the 
original strategy that called for the progressive development of 
industrial and agricultural production, and stressed the rapid 
improvement of the region's infrastructure. Simultaneously, local 
authorities confirmed that the special tax policies granted to 
the region by document No.11 of 1983 and the State Council 
21 decision of November 1984 were to remain unchanged. Therefore 
it appears that, while they were still interested in stimulating 
the region's economy, the authorities wanted to retain a great 
degree of control over the pace and nature of the overall 
development. 
19. "Starting point for "exploiting and Building the Treasure Island", HNRB: 03/09/85, trans. JPRS-CEA-85-
094, 28 October 1985, pp.39-41. 
20. The article quotes Central document No.ll: "The exploitation and construction of Hainan Island should 
be based on its own abundant natural resources, fully tapping its own potential and achieving better economic 
resul ts so as to gradually build up an ec·onomic structure with the characteristics of Hainan Island." See: 
HNRB: 03/09/85, trans. JPRS-CEA-85-094, 28 October 1985, p.40; For more details on Central document No.I!, see 
Chapter 2, p.47-48. 
21. "Zhengque yunyong shuishou youhui zhengce, cujin wo qu kaifa jianshe", (Properly use the favourable 
policles for taxation and Speed up our development), in HNRB: 3 September 1985, p.?; The State Council decision 
of November 1984 refers to the "Temporary provision on the reduction of the •.• taxes of the Special Economic 
Zones and Fourteen Coastal Port Cities. ft 
68 
Gu Mu~s Visit w 1985 
By November 1985, the Central government was trying to 
minimize the impact of the Car Incident on the region's 
development by advocating a more moderate strategy. During his 
inspection of the island in late October, the Member of the State 
Council, Gu Mu, confirmed to the leaders and cadres of the region 
that the Central government continued to uphold the spirit and 
strategy outlined in the State Council document No.202 of 
1980, 22 and the C e n t r Q. I do cum e n t No. 11 0 f 1953. 23 S p e~. kin gat a 
study session of the Regional Party Committee held a few weeks 
later, Yao Wenxu, the Party Committee Secretary, echoed Gu Mu's 
words and attributed the rapid development of the region 
accomplished since 1980 to the implementation of these two 
"4 documents.~ These references to the State Council document 
No.202 may be interpreted as an attempt to return to the more 
conservative strategy outlined in early 1950. 
Zhao ZiyangWs Visit7 1986 
But the region's development was only temporarily affected 
by the events of 1985. It received a significant boost during the 
22. For more detail on the State Council Document No.202, see: The Embryo of the New Strategy, Chapter 2, 
p.24-28. 
23. ftHainan yao jianchi yi kaifang cu kaifa fangzhen n , (Hainan should uphold the policy of 'development 
through openness'), in NFRB: 10 November 1985, p.l; for more details on the Central Document No.ll, see: 
Summary of Central Document No.ll, Chapter 2, pp. 47-48. 
24. ftJin yi bu gao hao Hainan dao de kaifa jianshe", (Continue to properly handle Hainan island 
development process), in HNRB: 5 December 1985, p.l,4; It is intQresting to note that although he was severely 
criticized for his role in the 'Car Incident', Yao Wenxu kept his position as secretary of the Regional Party 
Committee; See: Chang Chen-pang, "The Hainan Vehicle Trafficking Scandal", in Issues & Studies, Vol.21, No.9, 
September 1985, pp.5-7. 
visit of Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili and Tian Jiyun in February 1986. 
Carrying out their inspection of the island, the three leaders 
gave some clear indication on the nature and direction of the 
development strategy the region should be implementing. 
As an island Hainan has easy access to the outside world; it is 
also located in the tropical zones and is comparatively rich in 
products and resources. These two very special points should 
determine its development strategy and opening up policies. 25 
(Translation provided) 
They demanded that the development strategy focus on the 
production and processing of tropical products. In addition, it 
should actively develop animal husbandry and fishing. They also 
specifically encouraged the rapid expansion of the tourist 
industry. Furthermore, they explained that the special policies 
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and privileges gfanted to the island were an integral part of the 
development strategy and should be used to earn foreign currency, 
attract foreign investment, and invite mor~ capital and personnel 
from other parts of the country. Finally, they pointed out that 
the swift resolution of the problem of insufficient qualified 
personnel, the greater integration of the State Farms in the 
development process and the strengthening of the unity of the 
region's various ethnic groups and levels of government were 
three important keys to the rapid development of the region. ~ 
25. "Jianchi kaifang gaohuo gaige jiakai Hainan dao kaifa jianshe", (Insist on openness and innovations to 
speed up Hainan isalnd deveiopaent), in RMRB: 20 February 1986, p.l; and ttChongxin zhenzuo jingshen, gao hac 
baD dao kaifa jianshe", (Again show vigor and spirit, properly develop the treasure island), in NFRB: 20 
February 1986, p.l,3; also: HNRB: 20 February 1986, p.l. 
26. See footnote 23; The fact that this article is published simultaneously by the central, provincial, 
and local newspapers demonstrates the importance of this visit and great significance of the instructions 
transmitted. 
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Impact of the Visit 
The influence of the instructions given by these three 
important visitors was rapidly felt. For example, immediately 
after their departure the regional leaders organized a meeting to 
study how to rapidly improve and expand the island's tourist 
industry. The meeting, which included various experts, put 
forward a series of proposal addressing the diverse problems 
hindering the development of tourism in the region. 27 Another 
example was the greater recognition of the past and future role 
of the State Farms and the Land Reclamation Bureau in the 
d eve lop men t 0 f the i s 1 and. 28 
There were other signs that the instructions given by Zhao 
Ziyang during his visit " to Hainan island in early 1986 became the 
core of the region's development strategy. On many occasions, 
Meng Qingping, the Regional government's main responsible person, 
refered to the guidelines given by the Central government leaders 
when discussing the regional development plan. 29 The improvement 
oft he coo pe r "a. t ion bet wee nth e i s 1 3. n d 's i n d u s t r i e sun de r va r i 0 u S 
1 e v 8 1 S 0 f go v ern men t be c a me 3 . pr i 0 r i t y. 30 Eve n a. :; tu d y 0 nth e 
27. "Kaifa Hainan luyou ziyuan lunzheng hui zuijin zai shidi zhaokai", (Forum for the development of 
Hainan's tourism resources was held recently), in HNRB: 2 Harch 1986, p.l. 
28. -Hainan dao nongkang qiye - bao dao jianshe de 'jiasuqi'", (The " enterprise under the Hainan Land 
Reclamation System are 'instrument' to speed up the development of the treasure island), in NFRB: 22 March 
1986, p.l. 
29. ~Heng Qingping tan 'yi kaifang cu kaifa' de fangzhenft, (Heng Qing Ping talk about the principle of 
wdeveloping through openness), in HNRB: 9 April 1986, p.2; and ftHainan's Heng Qing Ping interviewed on 
development plans·, in JPRS: no.055 6 May 1986, p.l6-17. 
30. WZenyang fazhang wo qu neibu de hengxiang jingji lianhe", (How to develop the horizontal economic 
cooperation in the island),in HNRB: 4 April 1986, p.2. 
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scientific 8xploitatiori of the region's resources published in 
July 1987, is perfectly in line with Zhao Ziyang's directives, 
and singles out tropical agriculture and tourism as the two ~eys 
t 0 s pe 8 d l.A P t h 8 d eve lop m El n t 0 f the i s 1 C3. n d. 31 The r El for e J it · s El El m s 
that, following the Car Incident, despite a period of serious 
reevaluation the strategy only underwent minor readjustment until 
the establishment of Hainan province was suggested in August 
1987. 
The Establishment of Hainan Province 
The Formal Proposal 
On 28 th A u g us t 1987, a t the 22 nd M e 8 tin g 0 f the M e m b 8 r s 0 f 
the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, 
held in Beijing, the Premier of the State Council, Zhao Ziyang 
proposed the abolition of the Hainan Administrative District and 
the establishment of Hainan Province. His proposal explained that 
such administrative modification was necessary to further speed 
up the develop~ent and construction of the island. ~A more 
precise statement of the values of changing the status of the 
region was also provided by the Minister for Civil 
Administration, Cui Naiwei. 
31. "Kexue de kaifa Hainan dao youshi ziyuan changye", (Scientifically develop Hainan Island's superior 
Natural Resources), in RHRB: 10 July 1987, p.5. 
32. "Shengyi chexiao Hainan xingzhengqu sheli Hainan sheng yi an", (Deliberation on the proposal for 
dismissing the Hainan Administrative Region and setting up Hainan Province), and "Zhao zongli tiyi she Hainan 
sheng., (Preaier Zhao propose to set up Hainan province), in RMRB: 29 August 1987, p.1; See also "Liu ceng quan 
guo ren da chang wei hui 22 ci huiyi zai jing juxing", (The 22th meeting of the Member of the Standing 
Comlittee of the National People's Congress is being held in Beijing), in NFRB: 29 August 1987, p.l. 
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After Hainan will have become a province, the direct leadership of 
the Central Government,will help concentrate the nation's support 
for Hainan development, will help Hainan carry out its more open 
and relax policies, will contribute to the simplification of the 
government a.nd expansion of power, to reduce the middle- link, and 
increa.se work efficiency. 33 (translation provided, emphasis added) 
The dEll i be r Cl. t. ion 1 o. s t e d ne Cl. r 1 y Cl new e e k , and 0 nth e 5 th 0 f 
September 1987, the meeting decided to submit the proposal to the 
First Meeting of the Seventh National People's Congress for 
examination and approval. Meanwhile, it authorized the State 
c 0 l_~ n c i I t 0 8 S t.a b 1 ish the Ha i n a. n Pro v i n c 8 's P rep a r o. tor y G r 0 up. 34 
Zhao Ziyang's Briefing 
Although the Preparatory Group was not formally established 
1.1 n t i 1 the 23 r d 0 f S e p t em b e r 1 987, 35 its two f u t 1.1 reI ea din g 
members, Xu Shijie (Head) and Liang Xiang (Deputy head), were 
immediatly summoned to Beijing. On September 11 th they met with 
Premier Zhao Ziyang. During this meeting, the Premier gave 
detailed instructions on the preparation for the establishment of 
the Province and outlined provisional plans for the development 
arid construction of the Island. 36 
As soon as Hainan Province is founded. it will be necessary to 
completely reform its political and economic systems, devolve its 
33. uGuowuyuan jianyi sheli Hainan sheng", (The State Council . proposes the establishment of Hainan 
province), in NFRB: 29 August 1987, ptl. 
34. Xu, op.cit., p.345. 
35. Xu, op.cit., p.345. 
36. The three other members are: lao Wenxu, the Regional Party Committee secretary and of Heng ~ingping, 
the senior leader of the Regional People's government and Wang Yuefeng, see: Hainan Sheng p.345; For the 
meeting between Xu Shijie, Liang Xiang and Premier Zhao, see: "Hainan to become China's largest Special 
Economic Zone", in Wen Hui Bao (Shanghai), 9 October 1987, p.1; trans. in JPRS: no.003 (11 February 1988), 
p.19. 
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foreign exchange management authority to lower administrative 
levels, eliminate its export quota restrictions, allow it to 
balance its own budget and rent its land, and give more preference 
to its foreign, Hong Kong, Macao, and domestic enterprise 
i n v est 0 r s. 37 
Although it was not disclosed for another month, this meeting 
seems to indicate that the Central government, or at least its 
Premier had already decided to grant the region the status of 
Special Economic Zone in addition to the provincial status. 
While Premier Zhao was briefing the two future leaders of 
the Pr~paratory Group, the central authorities were publicizing 
the positive impact of the development strategy employed in the 
region in the recent years. On the 10 thof September, the front 
page of the Renming Ribao carried an article summing up what had 
been accomplished on Hainan island since the State Council 
decided to speed up the development of the region in 1983. 38 
Because it linked the region's recent successes to the proper 
implementation of the principle of "using openness to promote 
development", the article could be interpreted as an attempt to 
foster the adoption of even more open policies for the region. 
The Preparatory Group 
It did not take long before these intentions were made 
public. On the 24th of September, only one day after the formal 
establishment of the Preparatory Group, Xu Shijie and Liang Xiang 
were able to announce, to a large gathering of local Party, 
37. nHainan to become China's lar%est Special Economic Zone w, in JPRS: no.003 11 February 1988, p.19. 
38. wHainan dao jianshe chuxian zhan xin ju mianw, (New aspects of development have been observed in 
Hainan), in RMRB: 10 September 1987, p.l. 
g_overnment and milit~.ry· mRmber~. th~t the futu P" ld ~ - -r ~ ~ ~ re rOV1nce wou 
P. n J" 0 y m 0 res p"'" c 1" a I poll" C 1" .-. t h t h f " t· .... E ,.., 39 
..., '= '=s an J e our eX1S lng :::, L.. On the 
following day, Gu Mu echoed their words when addressing members 
of a Sino~Japanese Economic Association. He told the visiting 
group of Japanese that Hainan Province would enjoy more open 
policies than those implemented in the four existing SEZ and 
t h " t " 40 o~ er open Cl J1es. These commentaries might have suggested 
that the rapid development of Hainan islartd was becoming a 
priority for the Central government and that it was ready to 
promote and support a more dynamic strategy. 
The Preparatory Group quickly set to work, and from 
September 2S th to October 4 t~ Xu Shijie, Liang Xiang and Wang 
Yuefeng carried out an inspection tour of the island. After 
visiting Haikou, Sanya, various counties and most of the ongoing 
key projects, they concluded that it would be unrealistic to 
attempt to develop the island all at once. Instead, they 
suggested that, in the short term, it would be more suitable to 
concentrate on the development of Haikou and Sanya. They also 
stressed the need to further speed up the construction of 
transport, 41 communication and energy supply infrastructures. 
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39. "Hainan jiang shixing bi tequ geng teshu zhengce", (Hainan will enjoy more preferential policies than 
the other SEZ), NFRB: 24 September 1987, p.l. 
40. wGu Mu zai huijian Re Zhong jingji xiehui fang hua tuan shi shuo, Hainan jiang caiyong guoji xianjin 
kexue guangli jingyan", (Addressing a visiting delegation of the Sino-Japanese economic association, Gu Mu said 
that Hainan will use advanced international scientific management experience", NFRB: 25 September 1987, p.l. 
41. wXu Shijie Liang Xiangjinxing huan dao kaocha tichu Hainan jinqi kaifa jianshe zongti shexiang", (Xu 
Shijie and Liang Xiang carry out an inspection around the island, and put forward the overall consideration for 
Hainan's short term development), in NFRB: 8 October 1987, p.l. 
Although in line with the previously implemented strategy, their 
provisional plan of action called for a more focused and urban 
oriented approach. 
Hainan Special Economic Zone, First consideration 
As the Preparatory Group outlined its suggestions, the 
future economic status and experiment~l nature of the new 
Province were being made public. First, on the Sthof October 
1967, Xu Shijis, disclosed that Hainan Province would be granted 
the status of Special Economic Zone. 42Second, on the eve of the 
13 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, a 
spokesman for the Department responsible for the work of the 
State Council revealed that Hainan Province would serve as an 
experimental region for economic and administrative reforms. He 
explained that the region would be used both to gain more 
experience with some of the methods already utilized in the other 
SEZ and to test other methods which had proved efficient in 9 ther 
parts of the world. 43 The timing and nature of these 
announcements suggest that the changes in Hainan's administrative 
and economic status were important items on the agenda of the 
Party Congress. It appears that the Congress responded positively 
to the proposed changes and provided the necessary ideological 
42. See: ftHainan to become China's largest Special Economic Zone", in JPRS: no.003 11 February 1988, p.19. 
43. "Gong guang du shen du shang kuo da dui wai kai fang", (Widen and deepen the scope of openness), in 
RHRB: 12 October 1987, p.l. 
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suppor t. 44 
Before the end of October 1987, a much clearer picture of 
the responsibilities, goals and characteristics of the future 
Province appeared. First, it wa.s announced that sta.rting fn 1888, 
the new provincial authorities would assume responsibility for 
the region's planning activities and that enterprises under the 
jurisdiction of either the Central or Guangdong Provincial 
government would be placed under direct control of the new 
pro v i ne i a 1 aut h 0 r i tie s. 45 Sec 0 n d , t h 8 0 V 8 r a. 1 I go a 1 5 for the 
medium and long term strategy for economic development of the 
Province/SEZ were outlined. According to Liang Xiang, during the 
first stage (from 1988 to 1996), the region should concentrate on 
1 13. Y i n g ~. good f 0 U n d a t ion! i nth e sec 0 n d s tag e (f r 0 m the 9 th t 0 
the 10th Five Year Plan), the region should foster overall 
de v 8 lop men t'. 46 Fin a I 1 y , X u S h i j i e was a. b let 0 pro v i d 8 S 0 me 
information on the special policies to be granted to China's 
fifth SEZ. He explained that the greater autonomy in decision-
m o. kin g power be i n g.. g ran t e d tot her e g ion, the m'o r e r~ e I a x e d 
policies on foreign exchange, land use and entrance requirements 
for foreigners, should all help accelerate the development of the 
44. ftHainan jian sheng chou bei zhu zhao kai xian yi shang ganbu huiyi tichu, yi shi san da qingshen wei 
zhizheng jiasu kaifa baD dao n , (The Preparatory Group for the establishment of Hainan province . open the county 
level cadres meeting and put forward, Use the spirit of the 13th Party Congress as a guideline to speed up the 
opening of the treasure island), in NFRB: 16 November 1987, p.l. 
45. ftHainan mingnian zhuyao jihua zhibiao ft , (Next year Hainan will plan its on important target), in NFRB: 
20 October 1987, p.l. 
46. By 'Laying good foundation' meant, the development of Haikou and Sanya and the improvement of the 
region's infrastructure, see: ftQian ba nian da jichu, hou shi nian da fazhang", (The first 8 year lay the 
foundation, the last ten year great development), in NFRB: 28 October 1987, p.l. 
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r e g ion.. 47 The r e for ewe S 8 e how, pro g r 8 s s i vel y , the P rep a r 3. tor y 
Group was carrying out the instructions given to its leaders by 
Premier Zhao in early September. 
By the middle of November, Central government 
representatives and agencies were qble to confirm the new 
province's future economic status and upcomming preferential 
policies. On ~ovember 12t~ Gu Mu received a delegation of 
Japanese investors and declared that Hainan island was to become 
China's largest SEZ. He also announced that many of the special 
and more relaxed policies granted to the region would be approved 
and made public before the end of January 1988. ~On the same 
day, various departments involved in the drawing up of the new 
regulations substantiated Gu Mu's declarations and reported that 
the State Council was already examining and approving some of the 
new po 1 i c i e s . 49 The sed eve lop men t s s u g g est t ha t the 13 th P 3. r t y 
Congress positively influenced the speed of the policy 
formulation and administrative reorganization process. In fact, 
it could be argued that the decisions of the Congress placed the 
Hainan Province SEZ at the forefront of both the national and 
coastal development strategy. 
47. "Hainan dui ge guo pengyou kai da men", (Hainan open wide its door to all foreign friend), in NFRB: 
29 October 1987, p.l. 
48. Gu Mu explained that industrial crops, aquatic products breeding and tourism should form the three 
core element of the first phase of region's economic development strategy, see: "Hainan dui wai kaifang ruogan 
guiding jijiang gongbu", (Some of the regulations concerning the opening up of Hainan will soon be made 
public), in NFRB: 14 November 1987, p.!. 
49. ftHainan jiansheng you you xin de youhui zhengce ft , (As it becomes a province, Hainan will also be 
granted new preferential policies), in NFRB: 14 November 1987, p.l. 
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This was apparently how the Preparatory Group and the 
island's cadres perceived the new role of the region. For 
example, a meeting between the Group and the region's (above 
county level) cadres that ended on the 14 th of November 
concluded: 
The decision to transform Hainan into China's largest Special 
Economic Zone is one of our country major step in speeding up its 
reforms and opening, it is also a glorious historical mission 
bef~owed on Hainan by the Central Government. The spirit of the 
13 Party Congress must certainly be used as the guiding 
principle for the establishment of Hainan SEZ ..• 50 (tra.nslation 
pro'Jided) 
In addition, this meeting also identified the most pressing tasks 
facing the region. Not surprisingly these were: the improvement 
of agricultural production, a better utilisation of the 
favourable policies granted to the region, to continue the 
development of the infrastructure, and to rapidly train or 
attract qualified personnel. 51 Both the important role of the 
region and the nature of the tasks ahead were confirmed during a 
visit of Haikou City and Wenchang county by Gu Mu between the 7 th 
to the 12 thef December '1987. 52 Once again, he rei terated that 
the policies the Central government was adopting for Hainan 
Island were more special and open than those implemented in the 
50. NHainan jian sheng chou bei zhu zhao kai xian yi shang ganbu huiyi tichu, yi shi san da qingshen wei 
zhizheng jiasu kaifa bao dao", (The Preparatory Group for the establishment of Hainan province open the county 
level cadres meeting and put forward, Use the spirit of the 13 th Party Congress as a guideline to speed up the 
opening of the treasure island), in NFRB: 16 November 1987, p.l. 
51. ftJingji mushi yao bi qita tequ qian jin yi da bu, Hainan jiang jiancheng shixing shihui zhuyi shichang 
jingji de tequ sheng", (Its economic model will go a step further than the other SEZ, Hainan will become a SEZ 
province implementing socialist market economy), in NFRB: 11 January 1988, p.1-3. 
52. ftHainan dao de chuang kou yao xiang wai", <The window of Hainan island should be open to the outside), 
in NFRB: 13 December 1987. 
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other four SEZs. 
Abolition of the Li-Miao Autonomous Prefecture 
In addition, the Central government was taking important 
measures to unify and centralize the administration of the new 
province. Shortly after Gu Mu's visit, a very important 
resolution of the Central Committee and the State Council was 
implemented by the Preparatory Group. On the 18 thaf December, at 
the Second meeting of the 7th People's Congress 6f the Hainan Li~ 
Miao Autonomous Prefecture, the Hainan District Party Vice-
Secretary and member of the Preparatory Group Wang Yuefeng 
announced the abolition of the Autonomous Prefecture. He also 
proclaimed the creation of seven Autonomous counties and 
announced that the county level municipality of Sanya was lifted 
to prefectural level. 53previously approved by the State Council 
and included in a Circular of the CPC Central Committee and the 
State Council, the order to abolish the Autonomous Prefecture as 
probably been transmitted to the Preparatory Group by Gu Mu 
himself. 
By early January 1988, the Preparatory Group leaders are 
ready to unveil some details of the economic development strategy 
to be implemented in the future Hainan SEZ Province. According to 
.Xu Shijie and Liang Xiang, the preliminary draft produced by the 
53. In addition to the Prefectural level municipality of Sanya, the territory previously covered by the 
Autonomous Prefecture now include, the county level municipality Tongza, the Li-Miao Autonomous counties of 
Baoting and Qiongzhong, and the Li Autonomous counties of Baisha, Lingshui, Changjiang, Ledong, and Dongfang; 
see: "Chexiao Hainan zizhizhou sheli ti ge zizhixian", <Abolition of Hainan Autonomous Prefecture, 
establishment of seven Autonomous counties), in NFRB: 19 December 1987, pIl. 
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Preparatory Group in collaboration with a team of researchers 
from the Chinese Academy of Social Science included the following 
targets. First, the region should be persistant in implementing 
reform and continue to apply the principle of 'using openness to 
foster development'. Second, it should attempt to eliminate the 
drawbacks of the administrative structure and constraints of the 
old system. Third, the large SEZ should adopt a socialist market 
economy. Finally, the region should attempt to catch up with the 
most advanced regions of the country by simultaneously developing 
industry, agriculture, commerce and tourism, while giving 
priority to the industrial sector. The two leaders of the 
Preparatory Group also explained that while Hainan would be the 
largest and most open SEZ, it would remain a component of the 
national socialist economy. Nevertheless, they insisted that, 
although the basic characteristic of socialism would be 
maintained, market forces would be allowed to function more 
freely in Hainan than in the other four SEZ. 54 From the general 
guidelines included in this tentative draft it is possible to 
appr~ciate the important symbolic role the future Province SEZ 
was expected to assume. 
It appears that the formulation rif the new regional strategy 
progressed steadily, and by the 10 th February 1988, Liang V' -~lang 
disclosed that most of the preferential policies to be granted to 
the island had already been drawn up and would soon be announced. 
54. "Jingji mushi yao bi qita . tequ qian jin yi da bu, Hainan jiang jiancheng shixing shihui zhuyi shichang 
jingji de tequ sheng", (Its economic model will goa step further than the other SEZ, Hainan will become a SEZ 
province implementing socialist market economy), in NFRB: 11 January 1988, p.1-3. 
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Just back from B8ijing~ where he attended a meeting of Central 
Committee discussing the various problems concerning the 
establishment of Hainan Province and SEZ, Liang unveiled some of 
the upcoming policies to a group of local party, .governmerit and 
military leaders. He indicated that Hainan future economic 
structure would be based on Sino-foreign joint-capital, joint-
venture, and solely foreign owned enterprises. He also repeated 
that the region's economy would be primarily regulated by market 
mechanisms. He confirmed that custom formalities would be 
simplified, that foreign visitors and capital would be allowed to 
circulate freely, and that importation and exportation of goods 
would be basically free. He stated that the Province's enhance 
decision-making power would now be under the direct "leadership" 
of the Party Central Committee and the State Council. Further, he 
added that the region would not only be used as a "window" to the 
outside world, but also would serve as an area to experiment with 
more advanced reform of the political and economic system. 55 
Thus, it appears that the Preparatory Group succeeded in pushing 
forward the instruction received from Premier Zhao in early 
September. 
During the weeks that followed more information was provided 
on some of the other preferential policies to be implemented 
after the establishment of Hainan Province SEZ. First, on 
February 13t~ the future regulations on Hainan land management 
55. ftHainan tequ youhui zhengce jijiang gongbu", (Hainan SEZ preferential policies to be announced soon), 
in RMRB: 12 February 1988, p.1; and "Zhong yang gei Hainan youhui zhengce yijing niding", (The preferential 
policies given Hainan by the Central Committe have already been drawn up), in NFRB: 12 February 1988, p.l. 
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t:; ~, 
we r e md. de pub 1 i c . ..,b S 8 con d ,on F 8 b r u a r y 25 t,h d, r 8 p res e n tat i ve 
from the Hainan unit of the National foreign exchange management 
bureau was able to offer some details on the region's future 
tore i gn exchange management po I icy. 57 Represent i ng the first. 
signal of the type of preferential policy to be granted to the 
Province/SEZ, both land and foreign exchange management policies 
were somewhat less restrictive than those implemented in the 
other SEZ. 
Appointment of Hainan Province CPC Committee 
Shortly after these preferential policies were made public, 
Hainan Province CPC's 'preparatory' Working Committee was 
established and held its first meeting. On February 26 ~ the 
Party Central Committee dissolved the Guangdong Province Hainan 
Administrative District Party Committee and announced the 
composition of the new Provincial Party Committee. XU Shijie was 
appointed as the region's Party Secretary, while Yao Wenxu (the 
former Party Secretary), Liang Xiang and Liu Jianfeng were all 
I + d V . ~ '. 58 se eCJ8 as lce-~ecretarles. 
The newly established Provincial 'preparatory' Committee 
immedia.te 1 y set out to work, and f ram February 26 th to Na.rch 1 st 
56. See: "Hainan zuo gong bu 'tudi guangli 'banfa'u, (Yesterday, Hainan announced its 'land management's 
regulation'), in NFRB: 14 February 1988, p.!; and "Hainan banbu tudi guangli banfa", (Hainan promulgated the 
regulation on land management), in RMRB: 17 January 1988, p.5. 
57. See: "Hainan waihui guanli zhengce gengjia fangkuan", <Hainan's foreign exchange management policies 
are more relax), in NFRB: 25 February 1988, p.l. 
58. ftZhong gong zhong yang jueding, Sheli zhonggong Hainan sheng <choubei) gongweihui", (The Party Central 
Committee decide to set up Hainan province CPC 'preparatory' working committee), in RHRB: 27 February 1988, 
p.!. 
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it held its first Enlarged Meeting in Haikou. Addressing the 
region's cities and counties Party Secretary, Xu Shijie 
acknowledged that given the island's poor infrastructure and' 
other serious problems, the development targets assigned to the 
Province were extremely high. While he recognized that the 
development of agricultural production and of village/town 
industries, and the improvement of the situation in the poor 
mountainous areas were important, he stressed the necessity to 
concentrate on the rapid development of Haikou and Sanya. In 
addition, he announced that Hainan Province's government 
organization would implement the principle of "Small government, 
Big society", and briefly explained the nature of the required 
reforms. Liang Xiang who also addressed the meeting provided more 
information on the preferential policies granted to the 
re g ion. 59 
Both Xu and Liang stressed three crucial characteristics of 
the reformed economic system to be tested in the region. First, 
economic activities should be regulated by market forces. Second, 
publicly owned enterprises should lose their priority in the 
economic structure and the proportion of all types of business, 
especially those involving foreign investment, should be 
increased. Third, foreign visitors and capital should enjoy free 
entry and exit, and the importation and exportation of goods 
59. wHainan jiji choubei jiansheng ban jingji tequ n , (Hainan is establishing the province and SEZ 
actively), in RMRB: 27 February 1988, p.l. 
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s h 0 u 1 d be b as i ca 1 I y f r e e. 60 0 nth 13 0 n e ha n d , t h 9 sum m~. r y 0 f t h 8 
Meeting recognized that the future govsrnment's very great 
decision-making power was the most important policy granted to 
the region by the Central government. On the other hand, it 
warned that in order to properly exercise this power, the ~egion 
would have to respect two preconditions: "first, to prevent 
Hainan from using the preferential policies to resell foreign 
goods, and second, to prevent other regions from illegally buying 
Foreign Excha.nge Certificate and evading taxes. ,,61 With the 
appointment of Hainan Province 'preparatory' CPC and the 
disclosure of the particular structures planned for the region's 
government organization and economic system~ the transition to 
provincial and SEZ status appeared almost completed. 
Immediately after the Enlarged Meeting, on March 4t~ the 
Preparatory Group convened a meeting with Hainan island 
Agricultural and Reclamation System (department). At the meeting 
it was revealed that the production units (farms and industries) 
under the jurisdiction of the department would adopt a series of 
special policies. First, the State farms were to progressively 
move from a planned to a market economy. Second, the Agricultural 
and Reclamation System would enjoy all the preferential policies 
and treatments granted to Hainan by the Central government. 
60. "Hainan zhaokai shi xian weishuji kuoda huiyi", (Hainan open the enlarged meeting of the cities and 
counties party secretary) in NFRB: 27 February 1988, p.lo 
61. "Hainan shi xian wei shu ji kuo da hui yi yu hui zhe biaoshi, Yong hac Zhong yang zhengce, Chuang ban 
zui da te qu·, (The participant at the Enlarged meeting of Hainan's cities and counties Party Secretaries 
declared, Properly used the policies granted by the Central Committee, and Set up the largest SEZ), in NFRB: 2 
March 1988, p.l. 
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Third, contracts for the management of farms with incompetent 
leadership, inappropriate management~ and long term financial 
deficit would be offered to the public. Chinese and foreign 
individuals or companies would be allowed to compete for these 
management contracts. Finally, the department leadership system 
would be reformed. This would be done through the creation of the 
Hainan Province 'Preparatory' Agricultural and Reclamation 
General Company which would have jurisdiction over the Hainan 
Agricu.ltural and Reclamation Company and Tongza Agricultural and 
Reclamation Company. Further, branch offices would be opened in 
all cities and counties. 62 While these intended changes and 
reforms demonstrated the willingness of the Agricultural and 
Reclamation System to adjust to the new regional economic 
reality, they also indicated the desire of the System to remain 
an independent bureaucratic entity. 
As the .Preparatory Group was finalizing its work in Hainan, 
the last details of the administrative reorganization were being 
worked out in Beijing. On the · 5 th of March 1988, Gu Mu formal iy 
presented to the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress the suggestion of the State Council that Hainan Province 
be granted the status of Special Economic Zone. 63 He told the 
standing Committee that although the region's development had 
62. "Hainan nongkang jiang shixing teshu zhengce B , (Hainan agricultural and reclamation department will 
adopt special policies), in NFRB: 6 March 1988, p.l. 
63. "Chuangzao lianghao waishang touzi huanjing, jiakai Hainan dao de kaifa jianshe", (Create a favourable 
environment for foreign investment and trade and speed up the development ot Hainan), in RMRB: 6 Harch 1988, 
p.l. 
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been speeded up in the last few years, the island remained quite 
backward when compared with other coastal areas. On this basis, 
explained Gu Mu, the State Council believed that granting Hainan 
Province the status of Special Economic Zone and al lowing it to 
adopt and implement more flexible policies than in the other SEZ 
would be beneficial to both the region and the nation. Confronted 
with what was~ more or less, a fait accompli, the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress endorsed the 
proposal. 
By the end of March, Hainan Province CPC 'preparatory' 
Working Committee's Secretary, Xu Shijie was able to announce 
that the Preparatory Group had accomplished its tasks. Just as 
the First Mesting of the Seventh National People's Congress was 
to open in Beijing, he summarised the principal characteristic of 
the economic and political system to be implemented in Hainan. He 
indicated that Hainan's new economic system would be primarily 
regulated by market forces. It would also be oriented toward the 
interna~ional · m~rke~. The role of" large and medium size state 
enterprises would be reduced, their ownership and management 
rights would be separated, and their legal status would be 
clarified. The role of the cooperative and individual sectors of 
the economy would be increased, and private enterprises would be 
encouraged. More importantly, various forms of foreign investment 
and ownership would be practiced and different types of financial 
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institutions would be established. 64 
The "Small Government, Big Society" model 
He also explained the "small government~ big society" 
structure of Hainan Province's future political system. On the 
one hand, "small government" meant that the new provincial 
government would hand over to society many of its economic 
functions, simplify its administrative structure, and reform the 
functions and work style of its offices. Cadres in both the 
government administration and civil service would be subjected to 
investigation and tests. In fact, the size of the new province's 
government organization should be only one-third of those 
existing in other provinces. On the other hand, "big society" 
indicated that the economic autonomy of all citizens and 
entreprises, entrepreneurial freedom of association, and the 
i n d e pen d o. nee 0 fin s tit uti 0 n s we r e g u a r o. n tie d. 65 By i n t e g rat i n g 
the particular administrative and economic system proposed for 
the island, the proposed "small government, big society" 
structure consecrated the inseparabil~ty of Hainan Province and 
SEZ, and embodied the experimental nature of the region. 
The First Meeting of the Seventh NPC 
Given the acknowledged complementarity of the suggested 
64. "Hainan jianshe lantu yijing huichu jiang yi quan xin mianmao zhang xian yu shi·, (The blueprint for 
Hainan construction has already been drawn up, it will present a completely new face to the world), in NFRB: 23 
Harch 1988, p.!. 
65. 8Hainan jianshe lantu yijing huichu jiang yi quan xin mianmao zhang xian yu shift, (The blueprint for 
Hainan construction has already been drawn up, it will present a completely new face to the world), in ~FRB: 23 
March 1988, p.l. 
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change in the region's administrative and economic status, it is 
not surprising that both recommendations were submitted the same 
day to the First Meeting of the Seventh National People's 
Congress, On March 31 5 \ the Minister for Civil Administration, 
Cui Naiwei, formally introduced the motion concerning the 
proclamation of Hainan Province. After indicating that the 
Preparatory Group had fulfilled its mission, he reviewed the 
principal justification for the region's new provincial status. 
H~ explained that, under the direct leadership of the Central 
authorities, the island government was to receive more help·from 
the continent and to enjoy more independence in the adoption and 
imp I El men t i:i. t ion 0 f m 0 reo pen, fIe x i b 1 e and s pe c i c3. 1 pal i c i e s. 66 
On the same day, Gu Mu submitted to the Congress the 
suggestion of the State Council that Hainan Province be turned 
into China's fifth and largest SEZ. Stressing that the most 
important task of the new Province would be to develop its 
productive forces, he explained that the Hainan SEZ should be 
allowed to implement more relaxed "and flexible investment and 
management policies than those practised in the other SEZ. 67 
Finally, on Apri I 13 th 1988, the First meeting of the 7 thNational 
People's Congress passed the resolution proclaiming the 
. P . ;-EZ 68 establishment of Halnan rOVlnce ~ . · 
66. ftHainan jiang chengwei quan guo zui da de jingji tequ", (Hainan will become China's largest SEZ), in 
NFRB: 1 April 1988, p.l. 
67. ftHainan jiang chengwei quan guo zui da de jingji tequ ft , (Hainan will become China's largest SEZ), in 
NFRB: 1 April 1988. p.l. 
68. Xu, op.cit., p.345. 
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Summary 
During the three and half years the Hainan Regional People's 
Government administered the re~ion o , Hainan island development 
went through three different stage. As seen in the previous 
pages, the passage from one stage to the next were marked by 
specific events and changes in the region's top leadership. On 
the one hand, despite reevaluations and readjustments, the 
regional development strategy that emerged around 1983 and 1984 
remained practically unchanged. On the other hand, the position 
of the region within the Chinese state and the role played by the 
various levels of government changed drastically. Therefore, it 
is suggested that these may be taken as three stages of the 
During the first stage the region was endowed with an 
ambiguous economic and administrative status. While it was still 
a part of Guangdong province, its newly established Regional 
People's Government and preferential policies allowed Hainan to 
enjoy a large degree of autonomy from both the Central and 
Guangdong government. This enabled Lei Yu and other local leaders 
to implement special policies that were particularly favourable 
to the region. The boldness of the local leaders ultimately 
triggered the Car Incident. The response of the local, provincial 
and central government to the crisis appeared to indicate that at 
this stage of the process, the balance between autonomy and 
control was compromised. The Centr~l government had to intervene 
and practically forced the Guangdong authorities to take action. 
90 
The nature of the crisis and the responses of the various players 
highlight the incompatibility between the region's development 
strategy and its administrative organisation and status. 
F 0 1 low i n g t his cri s i s ~ the r e g ion's d eve lop men ten t e 'r e d a 
period of reevaluation. This second stage was characterised by 
the appointment of a less assertive Regional government, the 
growing control and influence of the Central government and the 
subsequent reduction of the role of Guangdong authorities. From 
August 1985 to August 1987, the Central government reasserted its 
control over the region's development. The regional development 
strategy was left practically unchanged, but its implementation 
was constantly scrutinized and significantly slowed down. Meng 
Qingping, who had replaced Lei Vu, kept a low profile, and it was 
Zhao Ziyang who became the key figure. He launched the third and 
final stage of the process. 
Apparently it became clear that in order to move ahead with 
the selected regional development strategy~ it was necessary to 
clarify the region's administrative and economic status. 
Therefore? in August 1987, Zhao Ziyang proposed the creation of 
Hainan province. By granting the region provincial status, the 
Central government formally established its direct link with the 
region. Having suggested how -to institutionalize its control of 
th " t" C ~ W s t'hen ready to proposed granting Hainan ~ e reglon, ~he en~re a -
Special Economic Zone status. In addition, to further simplify 
th d "" t~" r- th regl"on the Ll'-I~l'ao Autonomous ~ e a mlnlSJra~lon 0 e _ ,1 
Prefecture was abolished. 
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Therefore by the end of the period, the region was a single 
political and economic entity directly under the authority of the 
Central government. It had also been granted a more ambitious 
development strategy that supposed greater autonomy. The impact 
of this new set up (direct link with the centre and greater local 
decision-making power) on'the region's development strategy will 
be reviewed in the next chapter. 
Introduction 
Chapter 4 
Hainan Province People?s Government 
(1988-1989) 
This fourth chapter covers the period going from the 
proclamation of Hainan Province SEZ to the end of 1989. During 
this period, the region began to assume its own personality and 
destiny. This is the third and final stage of the evolution of 
the region to evolve from a closed frontier region to an open 
provinc9w Now formally detached from Guangdong Province, Hainan 
Island had its own government reporting directly to the central 
authorities. It had become an integral part of the national 
political and economic life. As the most experimental region of 
the coastal development strategy, the island had become one of 
the core element of China's "open door policy". As in the two 
previous chapters, we will review the unfolding of the region's 
development strategy by looking at the key events marking this 
period. 
Setting up the Provincial Government! 1988 
On the 14th of April 1988, one day after the National 
People's Congress approved the motions to establish Hainan 
Province and SEZ put forward by the State Council, Xu Shijie 
emphasized the importance of maintaining and cultivating the 
special relationship existing between the new Province and 
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GUCi.ngdong Province. 1 He explained that Ci. l though HCi.inan W2l.S 
breaking away from Guangdong Province, both were to remain part 
of the same family. He described Hainan as Guangdong's younger 
brother, and stressed the complementarity of the two regions. He 
explained that while Hainan is endowed with abundant natural 
resources~ Guangdong has financial, technological and (qualified) 
human resources, and that extended cooperation would be 
beneficial to both regions. 2 While not surprising, this early 
call for the maintenance of the special relationship existing 
between Hainan and Guangdong Province may indicate that the new 
Province was worried of loosing the help and protection of its 
"big brother". 
On the 26 th of April 1988, the Hainan Province CPC Working 
Committee and government convened a general meeting of cadres at 
or above county level to transmit the decision and spirit of the 
recent 7 th NPC, and CPPCC meetings. Addressing the meeting, the 
Secretary of the CPC Working Committee, Xu Shijie exorted the 
cadres to concentrate on five principal tasks. First, he demanded 
that while giving priority to the development of the region's 
infrastructure for energy generation, transport and 
communication, they should work hard to "introduce from abroad 
and coordinate domestically". Both should help improve the 
1. It is important to note that Xu Shijie attended the NPC meeting both as a delegate from Guangdong 
Province and Head of the Preparatory Group for the establishment of Hainan Province, see: "Hainan jiansheng 




investment environment. Second, he asked them to devote major 
efforts to develop agriculture. Third, he stressed the need to 
properly manage eXisting enterprises. Fourth, he demanded that 
they i~crease work efficiency and change their work styl~. 
Finally, he required that they establish the new organizations 
and groups demanded by the new administrative status~ Repeating 
that the Central authorities had asked the new Province to adopt 
the "small government, big society" model when establishing its 
owh po .litical and economic organizations, he pointed out that the 
Provincial Party Committee, People's Congress and People's 
Government should not have more than 36 organizations. 3 After 
the meeting, Hainan Province CPC and People's Government 
officially open their offices. 4 
Implementing the "Small government, Big society" model 
Apparently, the new Provincial government quickly carried 
out the orders of the Central government concerning the 
establishment of a "small government". Only one month later, on 
the 26 th of May 1988, Hainan Province authorities announced that 
they had begun reorganizing the provincial administration. They 
indicated that they have established 42 provincial level 
departments, thus reducing by 25 the number of organizations 
directly under the control of the provincial government. Through 
3. For an interesting discussion on the 'Small government, Big society' model, see: Dong Shujun, ftHodel 
for restructuring Hainan provincial government-, in (Zhengzhou), Lindao Kexue (Leadership Science), No.S (Hay 
1989), pp.34-3S; trans. in JPRS-CAR-89-104 (23 October 1989), p.48-49. 
4. wHainan Sheng wei sheng zhengfu zuo zhengshi gua pain, (Yesterday Hainan Province Party COlmittee and 
Government hung up their signs), RMRB: 27 April 1988, p.l. 
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this reform, 520 people previously working for the Administrative 
District authorities were not included in the new provincial 
organizations. After implementing these measures the number ~f 
such provincial level organizations in Hainan Province was 1/2 to 
2/3 of those existing in any other province. The Hainan 
authorities claimed that these reforms created a greater 
separation between the party and the government, and between the 
government and the businesses, thus improving the efficiency of 
the provincial organizations and fostering the development of the 
"big society".5 By carrying out these measures, Hainan became 
the first Chinese Province to go so far in administrative reform. 
The establishment of the various government organs of the 
new province progressed steadily, and by the end of August, the 
First Meeting of Hainan Province People's Congress was held in 
Haikou. Hainan Governor, Liang Xiang, used this occasion to 
announce that the provincial authorities were getting ready to 
designate certain areas specifically for Taiwanese investors. 6 
By the time of t~e Meeting, the provincial party and government 
authorities had already formulated the overall strategy for the 
region's development. It included a regional economic development 
strategy, overall construction programmes for Haikou and Sanya, 
and rules and -regulations for the development of other areas. The 
5. "Hainan 'xiao zhengfu' jiqi kaishi yunzhuan", (Hainan's 'small government' apparatus begin 
functioning), RMRB: 30 May 1988, p.l. 
£. This is the first indication that Liang Xiang had been formally appointed Governor of Hainan Province, 
see: "Hainan jiang sheli ruogan Taiwan sheziqu", (Hainan will create several area for Taiwan investment), RMRB: 
26 August 1988, p.l. 
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provincial government also announced that it had reduced the 
number of organizations under its direct control to 27 
de par t men t s . I n add i t ion, i t was rep 0 r t e d t hat en erg y sup ply', 
telecommunication and transportation had been improved, and that 
foreign and domestic investment were increasing. 7 Therefore, the 
establishment of Hainan Province appeared to have given a new 
momentum to the region's development. 
Symbolic Role of the Region 
The First Meeting of Hainan People's Congress was rapidly 
followed by the First Hainan Provincial Party Representative 
Assembly. Attended by 230 delegates, the meeting opened in Haikou 
on September 1 st 1988. The Delegates heard Xu Shijie's report in 
which he discussed why Hainan Province and SEZ were established. 
He explained that tha region was granted this status so that it 
could use particular institutions and management methods 
developed and proven efficient both nationally and 
internationally. These should be used to increase the region's 
pro"ductivity, to take full advantage of its rich natural 
resources and thereby allow Hainan to play an important role in 
the realization of China's "One country, Two System". He stressed 
that while formulating and implementing economic policies 
attractive to investors, the region should carefully study Hong 
Kong's economic policies, laws and regulations. He claimed that 
through this process, the region would not only become the 
7. ftHainan jianshe jingji datequ gan de hao kaiduan", (Hainan has a good start for her economic zone 
development), in RMRB: 26 August 1988, p.2. 
country's largest SEZ but also the most advanced area 
experimenting with the "Creation of several internal Hong 
Kongs".8 By offering these details, Xu Shijie not only 
highlighted the experimental character of Hainan Province, but 
also specially underlined the great symbolic role entrusted to 
the region. 
New Comprehensive Development Plan 
By the middle of October 1988, the Chinese government 
announced that a comprehensive plan has been approved for the 
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development of Hainan Island. Drawn up by the Land Bureau of the 
State Planning Commission and Japan's International Cooperation 
Project Corporation, the "Hainan Island Comprehensive Development 
Plan" indicated the objectives, orientation, projects and 
strategy of Hainan development. According to the development 
strategy proposed in the plan, measures should be taken so that 
industry would progressively replace agriculture as the main 
economic sector. The selected strategy also encourag~d the 
introduction of a new production structure that would favour a 
better integration of industry, agriculture and tertiary 
sector. 9 Both the formulation and the scope of this development 
plan demonstrated the readiness of the Chinese government to let 
foreign expertise and experience kindle the development of Hainan 
8. ffHainan sheng shouci dang dai hui zuo qi juxing", (Hainan Province First Party Congress began 
yesterday), NFRB: 2 September 1988, p.l. 




A good example of the impact of the "Comprehensive 
d ~velopment plan", was th 1 t' f th d 1 t f 
- e acce era lon 0 e eve opmen 0 one 
of the region's key areas, Sanya Municipal ity. Before the ' end of 
1988, China's southernmost city was carrying out a series of 
major projects to improve its basic infrastructure. Water and 
energy supplies were being increased, postal and telephone 
services were being expanded, and roads were being widened and 
paved. In addition, construction of the area's largest 
infrastructure project, Sanya Feng Huang International airport, 
was ready to begin. The tourist industry was also expanding its 
base, and a number of large hotels were being constructed. 10 
Although many of these projects had ,started before the island VIas 
granted provincial status, it appears that the combination of 
this administrative reorganization and the adoption of the 
"Comprehensive development plan" provided new vitality to the 
region. 
The Spring of 1989 
Although some un ex pe c t e d pro b 1 ems had bee n rep 0 r t e d, 11 t. 
looked as if by January 1989, the region was finally given the 
necessary tools to implement its particular development strategy. 
With its unified and simplified administration, greater decision 
10. ftSanya Shi kaifa jianshe quanmian zhangkai ft , (The construction and development of Sanya municipality 
is undarway), in RHRB: 22 November 1988, p.l. 
11. For a good example of the new problems hindering the region's developlent, see: "Hainan need to 
establish new order in real estate market stressed", in JPRS-CAR-89-002 (4 January 1989), p.46. 
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making power, more relaxed and favourable policies, and a 
detailed development plan, the future of the new Province and SEZ 
appeared brighter than ever. This is apparently what Hainan 
Governor, Liang Xiang thought when he outlined the region's task 
for 1989. 
Stressing the importance of carrying out overall reforms and 
of following the principle of "opening up to foster development", 
the Hainan Governor pointed at "the new road for the construction 
of H&.inan Special Economic Zone." 12According to Liang Xiang, ~.s 
Hainan was reforming, opening, and developing, it should adopt 
new ideas in order to fully utilized its natural resources, vast 
territory, and cheap labour to attract large scale foreign 
investment. In his view, foreign investors should be allowed to 
comprehensively develop portion of the regional territory. For 
example, he advocated the rapid development of the Yangpu 
development zone. He also indicated that large foreign and 
domestic financial groups should be invited to participate in the 
construction of the regions key projects. Commenting on the 
reform of the regional administrative and economic systems, he 
added that, despite early successes, a lot of work was still 
necessary to perfect the "Small government, Big society" 
model. 13 For example, he specified that many of the important 
12. "1989: Hainan zhenyang zou?", (How does Hainan progress in 1989), in HNRB: 11 January 1989, p.l. 
13. For more details on the region's successes and problems with the implementation of the "Small 
government, Big society" model; See for example: "Hainan Sheng: 'xiao zhengfu, da shehui' de gouxiang he 
shishi", (Hainan Province: ftS1all government, Big Society" concept and implementation), in HNP~: 11 April 1989, 
p.3; and "Xiao zhengfu tizhi wanshan tujing yi er", (Small Government systea completed channel one and two) in 
HNRB: 18 Hay 1989, p.6; also RHodel for restructuring Hainan provincial government", from (Zhengzhou), Lindao 
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economic management functions carried out by the government 
should progressively be transferred to the society or the 
enterprises. Finally, he announced that before the end of 1989, 
the province would promulgate important laws and regulations 
concerning the establishment and organization of Hainan's market 
economy. 
More information on these general guidelines were provided 
during the First meeting of Hainan Province Planning Department, 
h 1 . H' k th 14 e d In al ou on January 14 1959. Governor Liang offered 
more detailed ideas on how the region could best fulfill its 
tasks. Also Vice-Governor Bao Keming communicated the result of 
the meeting of the National Planning Commission and provided 
justification for Hainan's different planning tasks and 
met hod s. 15 Go v ern 0 r L i an g e x pIa i ne d . t ha t the r e g ion's p I ann er s 
should concentrate on six points. First, the planning department 
should recognize its new functions and implement the necessary 
r e for m s. Sec 0 n d , t h i ·s. pIa n s ho u 1 d g i ve pr i 0 r i t y tot he 
construction of the basic infrastructures. Third, it must also 
make sure that agriculture received the necessary input. Fourth, 
Kexue (Leadership Science), (No 5, May 1989), pp.34-35; trans. in JPRS-CAR-89-104 (23 October 1989), pp.48-49. 
14. aDui duoyuanhua jingji zuo tongpan kao-lu, suibu jianli qi hongguang tiaokong xitong·, (Have thorough 
consideration for a diversified economy, Step by step establish macro-adjustment system), in HNRS: 15 January 
1989, Pllo 
15. According to commentary published later, it appears that the Governor Liang and Vice-Governor Sao 
viewed the development of the island from different angles; KIn order to restrain Liang Xiang's influence and 
tighten control over Hainan to prevent everything from falling into Zhao Ziyang's control, Sao KeRing, who went 
to school with Li Peng in the Soviet Union, was sent to Hainan Province to work as permanent vice governor and 
be a basis in Hainan. K, see: "Hainan Governor called victim of power struggleft , in JPRS-CAR-90-010 (7 February 
1990), p.75. 
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it must al low large foreign and domestic financial groups to bid 
on large infrastructure projects and obtain contracts to develop 
specific areas of the region. Fifth, the planners should 
encourage the rapid expansion of tourism. Sixth, they must 
guarantee the continued development of educational, cultural and 
medical institutions. Furthermore, Vice-Governor Bao Keming 
stressed the importance of respecting the spirit of the Third 
Plenary Session of the 13 th Central Committee, which enjoined the 
nation's planners to "Bring the economy under control, Rectify 
the economic order". But he also recognized that because of the 
region's weak economic foundation, tight government finance, and 
1 imited capital, 16 its planners could not be asked to imitCi.te 
the planning methods and models used by other provinces. 
Therefore he encouraged the provincial planning department to 
take full advantage of Hainan's special policies in order ftto 
foster the organic integration of its planning and market 
mechan ism. n 17 
Two key points might be extracted from these suggestions and 
demands .. -The first one, is that the province's planners were 
placed in the uncomfortable position of fulfilling local 
expectations while respecting central guidelines. The second one, 
16. Yith approximately 12~ of its population below the poverty line Hainan was still recognized as one of 
the poorest area of the country in 1988, see: ftJiakai tuoqiong zhifu bufa, cujin tequ jingji kaifa", (Quickly 
get rid of poverty and get rich, accelerate the economic development of the Special Economic Zone), in HNRB: 1 
January 1989. 
17. wDui duoyuanhua jingji zuo tongpan kaolu, suibu jianli qi hongguang tiaokong xitong·, (Have thorough 
consideration for a diversified economy, Step by step establish macro-adjustment system), in HNRB: 15 January 
1989, p.1. 
is the growing importance of the Yangpu Development Plan as an 
economic development model. 18 
The Yangpu Development Zone 
The Origin of the Project 
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Although the idea of the construction of a deep-water port 
in Yangpu (Dan county), can b 19 e traced back to 1975, the most 
ambitious and controversial project of the region's original 
development plan, only very slowly took off. In April 1985, 
Hainan and Beijing authorities had examined and adopted a 
feasibility study and preliminary plans for the project. 20 In 
August 1985, it was announced that the Central government had 
formally approved the construction of a new deep harbour in 
Yangpu Bay, in Dan county (Northwest Hainan). 21 Expected to be 
completed during the Seventh Five Year Plan and estimated to cost 
180 mil lion yuan, the first phase of the project was opened to 
tender in November 1985. 22 
As preparation for the constr~ction of the harbour 
continued, the Hainan Regional Government drew up a comprehensive 
18. For a very interesting discussion of the numerous problems of development faced by the new provincial 
government and the use of the Yangpu development plan as a model for the island's econolic development; see: 
Zhang Siping, wDui Hainan jingji tequ jianshe zhong ruogan zhongda wenti de kanfa", (Opinion on the main 
problems in the development of Hainan Special Economic Zone), in HNRB: 16 February 1989, p.6. 
19. "Hainan land lease plan for Yangpu creates 'Storm'U, in (Hong Kong), Liaowang (Outlook), (No.17, 24 
April 1989) , pp.7-9; trans. in JPRS-CAR-89-064 (22 June 1989), p.53. 
20. BHainan makes progress in port constructionw, in JPRS: no.113 (31 December 1985), p.88. 
21. "Hainan plan new deep harbour approved-, in JPRS-CEA-85-086, (25 September 1985), p.42. 
22. "Harbour project ready for bidsw, in JPRS-CEA-85-104 (25 November 1985), p.29. 
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pia n for the de vel 0 pm 9 'n t 0 f Y a n g p u c i t y . I n A u g u s t 1986, the 
Regional Government adopted a twenty year plan calling for the 
construction of a 50 km2 modern open-style industrial port city 
in the Yangpu area. 23During his inspection of the Ya.ngpu 'a.rea. 
in February 1987! Premier Zhao Ziyang endorsed the proposed 
pIa n. 24 By M a y 1 987, two t wen t y t h 0 usa n d ton be r t h and a. w ha. r f 
for work ship were being built and a 52.9 km highway linking the 
wharf to the existing road was under construction. But the 
Regional Government was unable to raise the large amount of 
capital necessary for the realization of these ambitious 
projects, and by the time Hainan Province was established, the 
local authorities were negotiating with foreign investors. ~ 
The Yangpu Development Model 
Not long after the establishment of Hainan Province, the 
Yangpu Economic Development Zone was presented as the core and 
model of the province"s development strategy. In mid August 1988, 
Hainan Governor, Liang Xiang, announced that the provincial 
authoriti~s were considering operating the Yangpu Economic 
23. "Hainan draws up plan for construction of Yangpu port", in JPRS-CEA-86-115, (30 October 1986), p.24; 
For more details on the plan, see also: "Hainan plan new deep harbour approved", in JPRS-CEA-85-086, (25 
September 1985), p.42. 
24. Premier Zhao encouraged the Secretary of the Party Committee of Guangdong Province, Lin Ruo, and the 
Secretary of the Party Committee of Hainan Administrative Region, Yao Wenxu, to implement the proposed 
development plan; see: "Hainan land lease plan for Yangpu ~reates 'Storm,n, .fro. (Hong Kong>, Liaowang 
(Outlook), No.17, (24 April 1989), pp.7-9; trans. in JPRS-CAR-89-064 (22 June 1989), p.54. 
25. For a detail account of the evolution of the development of the Yangpu Zone; See for example: "Yangpu 
ren de kaifa lIeng B , (The dream of development of Yangpu People) in HNRB: 5 Hay to 8 Hay 1989, p.2. 
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De vel 0 pm e n t Z 0 ne a sa" f r e e po r t " " 26 He 13 x p I a i ne d t hat the 
development and administration of the Zone (100 km 2) would be 
similar to those used in other "free ports" of the world" 
Within a few months more details were released on the nature 
of China's first "free port". By November 1988 M M X' 
, r. a lyan, the 
director of the Yangpu port preparatory division of Hainan 
Provincial Port Bureau, was able to announce that free port 
policies similar to those existing in Hong Kong and Singapore 
were being considered for the Yangpu Zone~ He disclosed that the 
particular policies to be implemented in the Zone were being 
formulated by the Hainan People's Government Social and Economic 
Development Research Centre and that the Provincial authorities 
would soon be able to announce Yangpu's special "free port" " 
policies. Furthermore, he revealed that the Japanese construction 
contractor Kumagai Gumi Co. Ltd had signed an agreement with the 
provincial authorities to lease (for 70 years) and develop more 
than 30 km2 of the Yangpu Zone. 27 He added that the Japanese 
company planned to invest approximately 20 billion Hong Kong 
dol 1 a r i n m a j 0 r i n fro. s t r u c tu rep r 0 je c t s. 28 T his i n for m at ion 
26. "Hainan Yangpu kaifaqu jiang jiancheng 'ziyougang'ft, (Hainan YangPu Development Area will be 
established as a 'Free Port') in RMRB: 21 August 1988, p.l. 
27. This was not Kuuagai GUli's first venture in Hainan island. They were the key contractor in the 
construction of the Haikou Financial Centre, seat of the HainanBranch of the People's Bank of China, and were 
involved in other major commercial development projects in Haikou; for nore detail on the international 
activities of Kumagai Guui Co. Ltd.: See for exallple: Peter J. Rimmer "Japanese construction contractors and 
the Australian states: another round of interstate rivalry." In International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, (12 March 1988), pp. 404-424. 
"28. These included: roads, telecommunication network, sewage and waste water disposal system, and coal 
gas, electricity and drinking water supply; see: "First free port on line in Hainan", frol Hong Kong Standard 
(14 November 1988), in JPRS-CAR-89-003 (6 January 1989), p.37. 
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clearly demonstrates that the development of the Yangpu Economic 
Development Zone had become a priority for the new provinc~al 
authority. 
By late March 1989, the Secretary of Hainan Province Party 
Committee, Xu Shijie, and the Governor of the province, Liang 
Xiang were busy justifying the use of the "Yangpu model" to the 
members of the Second Session of the 7th National Committee of 
the CPPCC and the delegates at the Second Plenary Session of the 
7th National People's Congress. ~They explained that although 
Hainan was endowed with rich natural resources, neither the 
Central or provincial government had the financial resources to 
rapidly improve the region's infrastructure and develop its 
industrial sector. 30 Then they outlined the principal 
characteristics and goals of the "Yangpu model". Xu and Liang 
indicated that according to this development "model", foreign 
companies would be allowed to rent land in the Yangpu Zone for up 
to 70 years. They would enjoy the full decision-making power 
regarding development and management of the leased territory, but 
would have to abide by Chinese laws and regulations. They 
stressed that such arrangements were necessary to speed up the 
development of the region and gain more experience with 
international management practices. They argued that letting 
29. It is important to note that Governor Liang Xiang also acted as the leader of the coordinating teal in 
charge of the development of the Yangpu "free trade" Zone; see: wHainan land lease plan for Yangpu creates 
'Storm'", from (Hong Kong), Liaowang (Outlook), No. 17, (24 April 1989), pp.7-9; trans. in JPRS-CAR-89-064 (22 
June 1989), pp. 52-56. 
30. ftThe experts estimated that in the next 15 years, Hainan must invest 200 billion yuan to perfect 
infrastructure facilities like energy, communications, roads, ports, and water supply.-; Ibid. 
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foreign firms carry out the comprehensive development of certain 
areas represented the "New Road" for the development of the 
region. 31 
Opposition to the Yangpu Model 
Although Xu and Liang asserted that the implementation of 
the "Yangpu model" would not endanger China's sovereignty over 
the leased territory, some members of the CPPCC National 
Committee expressed serious reservations concerning the 
appropriateness of such development strategy. On 25 March 1989, 
Zhang Wei, Vice President of Qinghua University, made a speech 
condemning the proposed development model. Supported by four 
other CPPCC members, the speech entitled "Some Opinions About 
Hainan Province Acquiring Foreign Capital To Develop Yangpu 
Harbour Areas: The Problem of Sovereignty," argued that such 
lease of land would certainly jeopardize China's sovereignty. 32 
According to the speech, seven principal rsasons had led these 
five CPPCC members to oppose the "Yangpu model". These are: l)The 
similarities between the proposed leasing of land and the Qing 
government ceding Hong Kong and Macao to foreign powers; 2)The 
strategic military position of Hainan island; 3)The nationality 
of the company involved (Japanese) and the low price of the 
lease; 4)The nature of the facilities to be managed by the 
31. "Hainan zheng zou chu ban da tequ xinlu",(Hainan is moving on the new road to becoming a large special 
econollic zone) in Rl1RB: 23 :March 1989, p.1; and HNRB: 24 March 1989, p.!. 
32. "Hainan land lease plan tor Yangpu creates 'Storm'", from (Hong Kong), Liaowang (Outlook), No.17, (24 
April 1989), pp.7-9; trans. in JPRS-CAR-89-064 (22 June 1989), pp.52-53. 
foreign company (harbour and power plants); 5)The danger of 
having polluting industries implanted in the area; 6)The 
107 
extremely long duration of the lease (70 years); and 7)The future 
capacity of China to develop the area by its own means. ~A 
harsh debate was triggered by this speech and the Hainan 
authorities were forced to demonstrate the suitability of their 
new development model. 
Response from the Hainan Leadership 
Claiming that the Yangpu model was compatible with the 
region's development strategy outlined by the Central government 
in 1988, Xu Shijie and Liang Xiang rapidly responded to their 
opponents. M First, referring to the State Council's documents 
No.24 and 26 approved in 1988, ~they argued that the provincial 
authorities had the power to lease land for up to 70 years to 
foreign investors interested in the comprehensive development of 
certain area of the region. Second, they explained how the laws 
and regulations proposed in the model limited the autonomy of the 
foreign investors thus safeguarding the sovereignty of the PRC 
over the leased territories. They also maintained that the price 
33. See: "CPPCC members term Hainan lease plan humiliating, betrayal of sovereignty", froB (Shanghai), 
Shijie Jingji Daobao, (24 April 1989); trans. in JPRS-CAR-89-063 (16 June 1989), p.73. 
34. ftXu Shijie Liang Xiang wei Yangpu moshi shenshuo qingyou", (Xu Shijie and Liang Xiang state the haws 
and whys of the Yangpu model), in HNRB: 9 April 1989, p.l. 
35. State Council Document No.24 is titled: "Guanyu Hainan dao jin yi bu dui wai kaifang jiakai jingji 
kaifa jianshe de zuotanhui jiyao", (Summary of the Forum on the stepping up of the opening of Hainan island to 
the outside world and the speeding up of its construction and development); State Council Document No.26 is 
titled: "Guanyu guli touzi kai jianshe Hainan dao de guidingft, (Regulations on Encouragement for Investment in 
Hainan island); Mentioned in: ftJiandingbuyi de zou liyong waizi cheng pian kaifa de luzi", (Firmly not move 
away froB the road of using foreign investment(capital) to becoBe developed), in HNRB: 7 August 1989, p.l. 
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charged for the lease of land in the Yangpu Zone was in line with 
the price charged for comparable land in Shenzhen. Basically, 
they rejected all the reasons brou~ht up by the CPPCC members 
opposing the Yangpu development model, and declared ~hat 
throughout the formulation and negotiation process, the 
Provincial People's government had acted within the range of its 
authority. The Hainan leaders successfully defended their cause 
and by the end of April 1989 they returned to Hainan with the 
b I 8 S s i ,n g 0 f the C e n t r a, I aut h 0 r i tie son the de vel 0 pm e n t se hem e. 36 
The Central Authorities Intervened 
Now confident that the Yangpu Development Zone could be 
effectively transformed into a "free port", the Hainan provincial 
government accelerated the formulation of the Zone's management 
regulations .. By the end of May 1989, l,ocal and mainland experts 
were busy drafting specific regulations. According to local 
sources: 
The regulations will maintain state sovereignty over this 
'development zone and will give foreign in~estors full decision-
making powers in their business operations and full le~al 
guarantees for their legitimate interests and rights. 
Even the serious events which rocked the country in early June 
did not immediately appear to affect development of the Zone. As 
I' t a J 1 ' ne? 2 nd Ha l' n an'.- Go' v ern 0 r L 1- ~,n g' X 1- an r:t d 8 C I are d t. hat a.8 s _" _, ' .::J , a b 
Yangpu Development Zone remained the core experiment of the 
36. "Hainan land lease plan for Yangpu creates 'Stor.'", from (Hong Kong) Liaovang (Outlook), No.17, (24 
April 1989), pp.7-9; trans. in JPRS-CAR-89-064 (22 June 1989), p.S6 . . 
37. "Hainan enacts regulations for development zone", from (Hong Kong) Zhongguo Tongxun She, (27 May 
1989); trans. in JPRS-CAR-89-066 (27 June 1989), p.47. 
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Yangpu Development Zone remained the core experiment of the 
region's development strategy. He claimed that both Central and 
provincial governments supported the establishment of the Zone 
and that despite the recent national crisis, the development of 
the Zone would remain unchanged. 38However, by the middle of 
July 1989, it was announced that the State Council was 
reconsidering its position and that the establishment of the 
Yangpu Development Zone was postponed indefinitely. According to 
a Chinese source, conservative members of the State Council 
opposed the Yangpu development plan because it granted to much 
power to the foreign investors. 
They were worried the Yangpu model would set a dangerous example 
for other coastal cities to design similar development projects 
which would further weaken the central bureaucracy2s command 
system. 39 {emphasis added} 
The Summer of 1989 
The Downfall of Liang Xiang 
The direct intervention of the central government to stop 
the establishment of the Yangpu Development Zone was rapidly 
followed by the dismissal of the Yangpu model's mentor, Liang 
Xiang. In mid July 1989, Governor Liang, Vice-Governor Zhou 
Erkang and Provincial Party Secretary Xu Shijie were summoned to 
Beijing by the State Council to discuss Hainan Province'S 
38. "Hainan kaifang zhengce bu hui gaibian, Yangpu jianshe yao jixu zhuajin", (Hainan opening up policies 
cannot change, We will continue to have a firm grasp on Yangpu construction) in HNRB: 22 June 1989, p.l. 
39. "Development of Yangpu Port "Put on Hold", JPRS-CAR-89-82 (4 August 1989), p.19. 
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economic development. WAfter I· t . t th th 1S en1ng 0 J e ree provincial 
leaders' reports, the Central government's leaders expressed the 
view that, in carrying on their tasks the provincial authorities 
had abused the decision-making autonomy granted to the 
Province/SEZ when it was established. 41 Fo1 lowing this meeting, 
Zhou Erkang and Xu Shijie were sent back to Hainan island, but 
Liang Xiang was ordered to remain in Beijing. The Central 
government was not pleased with his leadership and had decided to 
investigate the nature of certain of his activities. ~ 
Liang Xiang stayed in Beijing and was charged with abusing 
his power for personal gain. The joint investigation group, 
composed of members of the procuratorial department, the Central 
Discipline Inspection Commission, and the public security 
department, which examined his case uncovered his involvement in 
activities incompatible with his position. His crime included: 
allowing his wife and son to participate in real-estate 
speculation; approving the importation of automobiles ~ithout 
following the proper rules and regulations; abusing his power to 
obtain a permit allowing one of his sons to emigrate Hong Kong; 
43 
and finally using public funds to pay for personal expenses. 
40. "Development of Yangpu Port "Put on Hold", JPRS-CAR-89-82 (4 August 1989), pp. 19-20. 
41. "Development of Yangpu Port "Put on Hold", JPRS-CAR-89-82 (4 August 1989), pp. 19-20. 
42. "Hainan Governor called victim of power struggle", froB (Hong Kong> Pai Hsing (The People), No.20! (1 
October 1989), pp.34-35; trans. in JPRS-CAR-90-010 (7 February 1990), pp.74-77. 
43. According to other sources the main reasons for Liang Xiang sacking were: his close association with 
Zhao 'Ziyang, his tolerance toward the student movement, and his confrontation with Li Peng over the 
comprehensive development of Yangpu harbour by foreign investors. See for example: "Hainan Governor called 
victim of power struggle", from (Hong Kong) Pai Hsing (The People), No.20! (1 October 1989), pp.34-35; trans. 
On September 13 th 1989, the Third Meeting of Hainan Province 
People's Congress studied and approved the report of the joint 
investigation group and the decision of the State Council 
concerning dismissal of Liang Xiang. The following day, lt was 
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announced that the Party Central Committee and the State Council 
had decided that Liang Xiang was officially dismissed from all 
his posts: Governor of Hainan Province; Vice-Secretary of Hainan 
Province CPC; Member of the Provincial Standing Committee. 44 
Following these decisions, Liang Xiang was allowed to return to 
Hainan but was to remain under house arrest as the investigations 
continued. 
Strengthening Central Control 
While Liang was kept in Beijing awaiting the result of these 
investigations, the Central authorities were both asserting their 
control over Hainan's development and reassuring foreign 
investors that the region's special policies would be not 
changed. On the one hand, at the Second Meeting of Hainan 
Province People's Government held in Haikou on August 1 st 1989, 
the Central government tightened its leadership over the region. 
Vice-Governor Bao Keming chaired the meeting and delivered an 
important speech stressing the necessity of following the 
in JPRS-CAR-90-0l0 (7 February 1990), p.74-77. 
44. "Zhong gong zhong yang guo wu yuan jueding chexiao liang xiang dang nei wai yique zhiwu tt , (The State 
Council decided to dismiss all of the posts of Liang Xiang within and outside · the Party), in NFRB: 15 September 
1989, p.!; and "Hainan Shengchang Liang Xiang fanyou yanzhong yi quan mou song cuowu dang zhong yang guo wu 
yuan jueding chexiao qi dang nei wai zhiwu", (Because Hainan province's governor Liang Xiang worked for his 
private interests, the Party and the State Council decided to dismiss him of all his posts within and outside 
the party) in RMRB: 15 September 1989, p.l. 
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guidelines and principles designed by the Central authorities 
when executing Hainan's development strategy. He confirmed that 
the region's special policies would remained unchanged but 
underlined that the provincial authorities should strictly follow 
the Central government's rules and regulations when implementing 
45 them. On the other hand, they reiterated that Hainan would 
retain its large degree of autonomy in establishing its own style 
of development and that foreign investors would be allowed to 
lease and carry out the comprehensive development of portions of 
the region's territory. ~However, there was a growing 
recognition of the difficulty of resolving the numerous 
contradictions and conflicts triggered by the coexistence of 
central control and regional autonomy. 47Nevertheless, while the 
Central government was proclaiming that the region's development 
strategy and its special policies were to remain unchanged, it 
was also bolstering its control over the administration and 
management of the new province. 
The Fall of 1989 
The New Governor 
On the 14th of September, one day after endorsing the 
dismissal of Liang Xiang, the Third Meeting of the Hainan 
45. RHainan outlines economic work for rest of year," in JPRS-CAR-89-094 (6 September 1989), p.36. 
46. ftJianding buyi de zou liyong vaizi cheng pian kaifa de luzi", (Firmly not move away frol the road of 
using foreign investment(capital) for localized comprehensive development), in HNRB: 7 August 1989, pp.1-2. 
47. ftTansuo da tequ kaifa jianshe xin luzi bitan", (Exploratory notes on the new road to develop the great 
special economic zones), in HNRB: 20 August 1989. 
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Province People's Congress selected the region's new Governor. 
The delegates elected one of Hainan province CPC Committee Vice-
Secretary, Liu jianfeng, as their new Governor. In his first 
speech as Hainan Governor, he explained that the Provinc~/SEZ 
should progressively implement the special policies granted by 
the Central government. He stressed that in the short term the 
region should concentrate its energy in establishing good 
. f d t· 48 economlC oun a lons. A few days later, on September 19 t~ he 
indicated that in order to establish the appropriate economic 
environment it was necessary to accelerate the screening out of 
co m pan i e sop era tin gin the pro v i n c e. 49 A I t h 0 1..1 g h he a. d v 0 ca. t e d a. 
more conservative agenda, Governor Liu maintained that the 
r e g ion J s de vel 0 pm e n t s t rat e g y wo 1..1 1 d rem a i ne dun ch a n g e d. 50 But 
in practice, the election of a less assertive Governor allowed 
the Central government to strengthen its contrdl over the 
province's development, thus greatly diminishing the significance 
of the greater autonomy previously granted to the region. 
48. Liu Jianfeng joined the CPC in May 1956, graduated from University (undergraduate) in 1961. Since 
then, he has occupied various position including: Vice-Minister of the Department of Electronic Industry, Vice-
Secretary of Hainan province CPC Working Committee, and Vice-Secretary of Hainan provin~e CPC Committee. He-was 
elected Governor at the age of 53. See: "Liu Jianfeng dangxuan Hainan Sheng Sheng Zhang ft , (Liu Jianfeng elected 
Hainan Province's Governor), in RMRB: 15 September 198,9, -p.!. -
49. This implied: the abolition and amalgamation of companies; the investigation and punishment of 
companies violating laws and discipline; redefining the mandate of the remaining companies; the resolution of 
conflicts between government, companies and enterprises over allocation of personnel, money and materials; and 
the improvement of companies rules and regUlations: See "Hainan governor on screening companies" in JPRS-CAR-
89-103 (17 October 1989), p.38-39. 
50. "Hainan tequ shixing gengjia kaifang de zhengce bu bian", (Hainan Special. Economic Zone implementation 
of even more open policies will not change) in HNRB: 30 October 1989, p.l. 
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Streamlining the Region 7 s Development Strategy 
The Fifth Plenary Session of the .13 thCentral Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party, held in Beijing in early November 
1989, did not modify the region's development strategy, but 
apparently delineated more precisely the limit of the region's 
decision-making power. After returning from Beijing, where he 
attended the Plenary Session, Xu Shijie, Hainan Province CPC 
Committee Secretary summarized the impact of the meeting on the 
. 51 H reglon. e announced that the policies and goals outlined in 
the State Council (Central) Documents 24 and 26 were still to be 
implemented. Talking about the national administrative reforms 
put forward at the meeting, he maintained these could only have a 
positive effect on the region's development. ~He also discussed 
the controversy surrounding the establishment of the Yangpu 
Development Zone. After minimizing the importance of the Yangpu 
model, he declared that the idea of the Development Zone was 
supported by the Central government's leaders, and that 
discussions were under way to reso I ve the remai ni ng prob I ems. 53 
Finally, he stressed that while the new province would continue 
51. ·Xu Shijie zai tan Hainan muqian de xingshi yu zhengce R , {Xu Shijie is discussing Hainan's present 
days situation and policies} in HNRB: 19 November 1989, p.l. 
52. For a more complete discussion on 'the impact of the proposed administrative reform on Hainan 
Province/SEZ's development; See for example: "Zhili zhengdun yu Hainan tequ gaige kaifang bitan", (Notes on 
Administrative Reorganization (rectification) and Hainan SEZ opening and reforms) in HNRB: 23 November 1989, 
p.6. 
53. According to recent information (Spring 1992), an International consortium, lead by Kumagai Gumi (HK) 
and including other Japanese, U.S., South Korean, and Chinese companies, has reach an agreement with the 
Central authorities on the construction of China's first free-trade zone, the Yangpu Development Zone; See for 
example: Elizabeth Cheng, "Island beach-head: Kumigai wins approval for China trade zone", in FEER, (30 April 
1992), p.64-65. 
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would continue to enjoy a great degree of autonomy in legislative 
and decision-making power, most laws and regulations drawn up by 
the region's government would have to be reviewed and approved by 
the Central authorities. 54 These explanations strongly 
suggested that although the Fifth Plenary Session did not altered 
significantly Hainan's development strategy, it underscored the 
determination of the Central government to monitor and control 
more carefully the development of the region. 
Summary 
Covering the two years following the establishment of Hainan 
Province/SEZ, this last chapter has und~rlined the difficulty of 
the new administrative unit to assert its unique identity without 
triggering the intervention of the Central authority. While the 
Hainan development strategy remained practically unchanged during 
these two years, the events covered in the previous pages seem to 
indicate that the Central government has gradually tightened its 
control on the administration and management of the ragion, thus 
greatly"reducing its autonomy. To reflect this progressive 
diminution of the region's decision-making power, these two years 
have been divided into four different stages. 
During the first stage which lasted from the establishment 
of Hainan Province to the end of 1988, the region enjoyed a large 
degree of autonomy. Throughout most of 1988 the new provincial 
54. This streamlining of the region's development strategy (same strategy, more central control) can also 
be detected in the New Year Speech delivered by Hainan Province's Governor Liu Jianfeng on December 31st 1989; 
See: WKaituo Hainan tequ jianshe de xin jumian", (Open up the new phase of Hainan SEZ construction), in HNRB: 1 
January 1990, p.l. 
! 
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government was busy establishing the region's new administrative 
and economic structure. Enjoined to implement the "Small 
government, Big society" model, Hainan's authorities rapidly 
reorganized the region's administrative and economic 
institutions. Simultaneously, with the help of foreign experts, 
the provincial government designed a comprehensive development 
plan. Both of these tasks were carried out with the minimal 
intervention of the Central authorities. It appears that during 
that stage the Central government leaders were primarily 
interested in the symbolic role of the region. Since they 
presented Hainan Province/SEZ as the best area to gain some 
experiences with the nOne Country, Two System" model and the 
creation of "Internal Hong Kong", the Central authorities did not 
interfer in the affairs of the region. 
But during the second stage, the Spring of 1989, friction 
between the Centre and the region began to surface. During the 
first two months of the year the provincial authorities continued 
to enjoy a large degree of autonomy in the implementation of the 
special policies granted to the region. Despite minor problems, 
the establishment of Hainan's special administrative and economic 
structure was progressing steadily. Although there were other 
signs that minor contradictions were emerging between the Central 
and provincial leadership, it was the promotion of the 
provincially designed nYangpu model" as the core element of the 
region's development strategy that triggered the most serious 
crisis. Spearheaded by Hainan's Gover'nor, Liang Xiang, this bold 
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move by the provincial authorities to lease a large track of land 
to foreign developers was severely criticised at the Central 
level. Although the provincial government were able to 
demonstrate that the Yangpu model respected the rule and 
regulations of the State Council Document No.24 and 26, in the 
end, the Central government judged that Hainan authorities had 
exceeded their decision-making power, and postponed the 
establishment of the Yangpu Development Zone. This action 
highlighted the limited scope of the autonomy granted to the 
region, and the decision of the Central authorities to tighten 
its monitoring and control of the region's development. 
By the third stage, the Summer of 1989, the Central 
government was progressively strengthening its control over its 
newest province. After launching the investigation which led to 
the firing Governor Liang Xiang, the Central authorities ordered 
the provincial government to rectify its economic management and 
administrative procedures. Both measures underlined the real 
~ower of the Central government over its provincial counterpart 
and highlighted its determination to heighten its supervision of 
the region's development. By the end of the summer, Liang Xiang 
was formerly accused of abuse of power and dismissed of all of 
his functions. The elimination of Hainan's most assertive leader, 
enabled the Central government to increase its control over the 
provincial leadership, thus greatly weakening the region's 
autonomy. 
Finally, during the fourth stages, the Fall of 1989, the 
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Central government c6ntinued to consolidate its authority over 
the region's development process. The election of the more 
conservative and docile Liu Jianfeng as Hainan's second Gove~nor 
epitomized the new relationship between the Central and 
Provincial government. Although, both Central and Provincial 
authorities maintained that the region's development strategy had 
not been altered, it became clear after the Fifth Plenary Session 
of the 13 th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that 
the Central government had more clearly delineated the decision-
making power of the region. 
The events reviewed in this chapter seem to suggest that by 
the end of 1989 the region's development strategy had been 
consolidated. On the one hand, the same strategy had been 
maintained. On the other hand, the region's development was 
firmly under the direct leadership of the Central authorities. 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to explore the evolution of a 
regional development strategy in the PRC. More specifically, this 
research looked at the evolution of Hainan island's development 
strategy. This analysis has identified and described some of the 
more important events caused by or affecting the region's 
development strategy. While exploring this dynamic process, the 
research has concentrated on two goals. On the one hand, it 
investigated the relationship between the region's administrative 
and economic status. On the other hand, it attempts to assess the 
role played by the three levels of governments (Central, 
Provincial, Regional) involved in the process. 
The presentation of the result of this exploration is 
divided in three sections. To highlight the administrative 
changes that affected the region between 1980 and 1990, the first 
section p~esents the administrative position and division of 
Hainan Province/SEZ as of early 1990. To sum up the results of 
this investigation, the seccind section reviews and discusses the 
findings of Chapter 11, Ill, and IV. Finally, the third section 
offers some closing comments. 
Administrative Profile (1990) 
By the end of 1989, both the region's position within the 
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PRC administrative hierarchy and the region's internal 
administrative division have been greatly changed. Originally 
under the authority of the Guangdong province government, Hainan 
had become a separate administrative unit under the direct 
leadership of the Central government. As argued in the preceding 
chapters, the elimination of this intermediary level between the 
Central authority and the region was directly related to and had 
a profound impact on Hainan's development strategy. Initially 
presented as a measure to sp~ed up the island development, it 
ultimately allowed the Central authorities to strengthen their 
control over the region. 
Halnan Province, 1990. 
Q eoc..ty ... n4IImM we ~ 
of 1he cotnv trieas so staBd 
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Fi gure 3 Hainan Province, Administrative Division, 1990. 
Hainan's internal administrative structure has also 
experienced significant changes (see Fig.3). The Li-Miao 
Autonomous Prefecture was abolished. Yaxian (county) was 
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abolishsd and replac~d by Sanya City. Both Haikou and Sanya City 
were granted Prefectural 55 level status. Tongza City was raised 
to the county level thus reducing the size of Baoting county: 
Thus by the end of 1989, the region counted three cities, nine 
counties and seven autonomous counties. Through these changes the 
administration of the region has been unified and centralized, 
thus consolidating the power of the new provincial authorities. 
Interaction among the three levels of government 
We have seen that immediately after the Hainan 
Administrative District Commissioner's Office was established, 
Hainan island was progressively endowed with a distinctive 
development strategy. The findings suggests that although the 
process was launched by the Central government, the strategy that 
emerged was the result of the complex interaction between the 
Central, provincial and regional (local) authorities. 
Furthermore, a closer analysis of the key events of the period 
hinted that the degree of influence of each level of government 
varied through the process. 
While the Central government launched the process, the 
provincial and regional governments rapidly made good use of 
their greater autonomy. Between 1981 and 1983, both the 
provincial government (Guangdong) and regional authorities 
(Commissioner's Office) were able to greatly influence the 
55. It is interesting to note that this upgrading to the Prefectural level has directly linked the two 
cities to the General Office of the State Council, thus further increasing the control of the Central 
government over the region's development; See: "Two Hainan Cities Linked to Central Decision-making", in JPRS-
CAR-90-056, 27 July 1990, p.lOl. 
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formulation process. With the support of his mentor, Guangdong 
province's Governor, Ren Zhongyi, the new director of the 
Commissioner's Office, Lei Vu, lobbied for more preferential ' -
policies and greater decision-making power. Thus, the region was 
apparently able to influence the drafting of its new development 
strategy. 
In March 1983 the CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council endorsed Hainan's development strategy. The leadership of 
the region immediately began to act as a more autonomous 
administrative entity and started drawing up a comprehensive 
overall development plan. By the Spring of 1984, the abolition of 
the District Commissioner's Office and its replacement (in 
,October 1984) by the Hainan Regional People's Government was 
announced, thus diminishing the influence of the Guangdong 
authorities on the region. Simultaneously, the Central government 
decided to formally integrate Hainan island into its Open Coastal 
Cities scheme, thus suggesting a renewed and growing interest of 
the Centre for the region development. 
Therefore by the time the Regional People's Government was 
formally established, the region found itself in an ambiguous 
administrative and economic position. Still under Guangdong 
Province's jurisdiction, the region enjoyed special economic 
~rivileges and a large degree of autonomy. But Hainan was not yet 
a full-fledge province nor a Special Economic Zone. This 
equivocal hierarchical position apparently weakened the capacity 
of both central and provincial authorities to monitor and control 
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the implementation of the region's development strategy and 
probably influenced the action and reaction of the different 
actors. 
The Hainan Regional People's Government managed th~ island 
between October 1984 to April 1988. This period has been divided 
into three different stages. The progressive exposure of the Car 
Incident and the crisis it triggered characterized the first 
stage. The succession of events which ultimately led to the 
dismissal of the region's key leaders, Lei Vu, highlighted the 
discrepancy between the region"s administrative status and its 
development strategy. 
Following this crisis, the second stage of the period was 
initiated. Despite a throughout reevaluation, the region's 
\ 
development strategy was not profoundly altered. But its 
implementation was seriously slowed down. A less assertive 
Regional leadership was appointed, the influence of the Guangdong 
authorities progressively diminished, an~ the control of the 
Central government gradually increased. This paved the way for 
the launching of the next phase. 
In August 1987, Zhao Ziyang formally proposed to lift the 
region to the provincial status, thus initiating the third stage 
of this period. By creating ' Hainan Province, the Central 
authority formally established its direct link with the region 
and eliminated the intermediary role played by Guangdong 
province. The new province' was also officially designated as a 
Special Economic Zone, thus recognizing and emphasising the 
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experimental nature of its development strategy. The new province 
was endowed with a large degree of autonomy, thus setting the 
stage for the last period covered by this research. 
The third period discusses some of the major events 
occurring during the first two years of the region's provincial 
administration. The analysis of the findings suggest that the new 
Province/SEZ rapidly experienced serious difficulty in asserting 
its unique identity. While the provincial government was 
apparently able to function with a large degree of autonomy 
throughout 1988, by the Spring of 1989 some contradictions began 
to surface between the Central and Provincial authorities. The 
most serious crisis occurred when Hainan's Governor, Liang Xiang, 
decided to place the locally designed "Yangpu model" at the core 
of the region's development strategy. After a long and fierce 
debate, the Central government judged that Hainan authorities had 
exceeded their decision-making power, and postponed the 
establishment of the Yangpu Development Zone. By this decision 
the Central authorities indicated their determination to increase 
their control over the region's development. 
Throughout the Summer and Fall of 1989, the Central 
government progressively exerted a greater control over the 
administration of its newest province. Hainan's first governor, 
the dynamic Liang Xiang was dismissed from its functions and 
replaced by the more passive Liu Jianfeng. Although both Central 
and Provincial authorities maintained that the region's 
development strategy remained altered, before the end of 1989, it 
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became obvious that the region's decision-making power had been 
significantly diminished. By then, the Hainan's development 
strategy was clearly under the direct leadership of the Central 
authori~ies. 
Final observations 
This study reveals that Hainan's administrative changes have 
unified and centralized the management of the region, thus 
consolidating the power of the provincial authorities and 
facilitating the implementation of its preferential (SEZ) 
policies. But, it also demonstrates that while the establishment 
of Hainan province was initially presented as a measure to 
further speed up the region's development, it ultimately allowed 
the central government to strengthen their control over the 
region. By diminishing the region's decision-making power, the 
central authority have seriously undermined the capacity of the 
new provincial administration to assert its new identity and take 
full advantages of Special Economic Zone status. 
Therefore the study suggests that it is extremely difficult 
to design and implement a successful regional development 
strategy within the context of the People's Republic of China. 
Furthermore, it indicates that unless the proper balance between 
regional autonomy and central control is found, the ·country's 
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